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Overall in Solomon Islands, foreign aid donors have neither engaged
effectively with transitional justice itself nor leveraged transitional justice in
support of broader development outcomes. Transitional justice in Solomon
Islands responds to the five-year period of violent civil conflict, the Ten-
sions, which devastated the Pacific Island nation of Solomon Islands from
1998 to 2003. The Tensions resulted in the deaths of an estimated 200 peo-
ple and left some 35,000 people displaced; many suffered abductions, ille-
gal detentions, torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence, and property
violations. To remedy past human rights abuses, several transitional justice
measures have been implemented in Solomon Islands, with varying degrees
of success. Transitional justice has been an area of significant foreign aid
donor engagement in Solomon Islands, though only limited analysis has
been conducted on the issue.
The recent transition of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands ("RAMSI") on June 30, 2013 invites critical reflection of the effec-
tiveness of aid directed to Solomon Islands over the ten-year period span-
ning RAMSI's mandate, 2003-2013. The nature and extent of RAMSI's
engagement with transitional justice is contemplated. Further, the unofficial
release of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
("TRC") report in 2013 sets up the TRC as ripe for discussion. Since the
TRC was largely donor funded, it follows that the effectiveness of this aid
be considered so as to learn from this experience. The intention is to under-
stand the degree to which effective transitional justice aid leads to more
effective and "development-sensitive" transitional justice measures.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to contribute to the ongoing conversation on the rela-
tionship between transitional justice and development aid.' It does so
through a single country case study of aid directed in support of transitional
1. See, e.g., LAW IN TRANSITION: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE (Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2014); TRANSITIONAL JUS-
TICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds.,
2009); Roger Duthie, Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Jus-
tice, 2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 292 (2008); Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding
Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Develop-
ment, 2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253 (2008).
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justice in Solomon Islands from 2000 to the present. Aid to transitional
justice has not worked well in Solomon Islands, and thus, aid approaches
need to be improved. This article addresses the question of what constitutes
effective, or successful, transitional justice aid. The article makes the fol-
lowing three arguments.
First, transitional justice is important for Solomon Islands and should
be pursued to remedy the legacy of atrocity. It concludes that its contribu-
tion to "social change" may well be "modest," but is "important." 2 While
transitional justice may "face complex challenges"-a lack of "economic
and human resources and/or moral and political capital"-if done well, it
can positively impact a society and its prospects for peace;3 for example,
through officially recognising past violations, creating spaces for reconcilia-
tion and empowering victims.4 It follows that in developing countries reel-
ing from egregious rights abuses, aid donors can play a role in aiding and
shaping transitional justice's success. Effective aid may enhance the suc-
cess, or effectiveness, of transitional justice. Equally, however, ineffective
aid may hinder success.
Second, foreign aid donors generally have not engaged effectively
with the full gamut of transitional justice measures implemented in Solo-
mon Islands. Though there are some noteworthy examples of effective de-
velopment practice, overall success has been mixed.
The related third argument is that donors have not adequately lever-
aged their transitional justice aid to achieve broader development and pov-
erty reduction gains. These two points of view are interconnected, as the
former weakness-ineffective development co-operation-limits the attain-
ment of positive development outcomes.5 The evidence for this is drawn
directly from the Solomon Islands experience with transitional justice aid.
Transitional justice in Solomon Islands responds to the five-year period of
violent civil conflict, the Tensions, which devastated the Pacific Island na-
tion between 1998 and 2003. The Tensions resulted in an estimated 200
deaths and left some 35,000 people displaced; 6 many suffered abductions,
2. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND EcoNoMic, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, at 6, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/13/5, U.N.
Sales No. E.14.XIV.3 (2014) [hereinafter OHCHR, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan Partnership for Effec-
tive Development Co-operation (Dec. 1, 2011). The text of the partnership agreement
provides that "[s]ustainable development results are the end goal of . .. commitments to
effective cooperation."
6. JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., PILLARS AND SHADOWS: STATEBUILDING AS
PEACEBUILDING IN SOLOMON ISLANDS (2010); SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILI-
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illegal detentions, torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence and property vi-
olations.7 The effect of the conflict was to set back development dramati-
cally. In order to come to terms with past abuses, several transitional justice
measures have been implemented in Solomon Islands, with varying degrees
of success. These have included criminal prosecutions for crimes commit-
ted during the Tensions, a truth commission, compensation, reform of state
law and justice institutions, and mechanisms for local and customary jus-
tice. While transitional justice has been a focus of considerable donor en-
gagement in Solomon Islands, only limited analysis has been conducted of
it.8
This article unfolds its arguments by critically assessing how aid do-
nors have engaged with each of the above-listed transitional justice mea-
sures. Particular emphasis is placed on the truth commission and
reparations, as well accountability for sexual violence suffered. This is be-
cause these topics have attracted the least focus in the literature. They are
also the areas where donors currently have the greatest scope for influence
in the transitional justice sphere in Solomon Islands.
The recent transition of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands ("RAMSI") in 2013 invites critical reflection on the quality of aid to
Solomon Islands under RAMSI.9 In particular, the nature and extent of
RAMSI's engagement with transitional justice is contemplated. Further, the
unofficial release of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's ("TRC")
report in 2013 by the report's editor sets up the TRC process as topical
ATION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 577 (2012); Renee Jeffery, Enduring Tensions: Transi-
tional Justice in the Solomon Islands, 26 PAC. REV. 153 (2013).
7. Father Norman Arkwright, Restorative Justice in the Solomon Islands, in A
KIND OF MENDING: RESORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (Sinclair Dinnen et
al., eds., 2010); PETER KENILOREA, TELL IT As IT Is: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF RT. HON. SIR
PETER KENILOREA, KBE, PC SOLOMON ISLANDS' FIRST PRIME MINISTER (Clive Moore
ed., 2008); Sinclair Dinnen, Doug Porter & Caroline Sage, Conflict in Melanesia:
Themes and Lessons (2010); Jeffery, supra note 6; SoLoMoN ISLANDS TRUTH AND REC-
ONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6.
8. Stina Petersen et al., Foreign Aid to Transitional Justice: The Cases of Rwanda
and Guatemala, 1995-2005, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE: STUDIES
ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 439 (Kai Ambos et al., eds.,
2009). The authors similarly preface their study of transitional justice aid to Guatemala
and Rwanda, explaining that little is known about the "scope, trends, and experiences of
that engagement."
9. About RAMSI, RAMSI, http://www.ramsi.org/about-ramsi (2014). 2013 marked
RAMSI's tenth anniversary and transition: RAMSI's development aid component was
brought under bilateral aid programs and RAMSI's military component ended. RAMSI
now remains in Solomon Islands as a policing mission only; this is expected to continue
through to 2017.
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discussion. Since the TRC was largely donor-funded, it follows that the
effectiveness of this aid must be considered so as to draw instructive les-
sons for transitional justice aid globally. The intention is to understand how
effective donor engagement with transitional justice may lead to more ef-
fective, "development-sensitive" transitional justice measures.' 0 This article
considers the question of effectiveness on two inter-related fronts: effective-
ness of aid to transitional justice, and effectiveness of transitional justice
measures per se. The shortcomings of the transitional justice measures im-
plemented in Solomon Islands-including their limited development im-
pact-suggest a need to rethink and recalibrate transitional justice aid
approaches.
1I. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To study transitional justice aid to Solomon Islands, empirical, socio-
legal fieldwork was undertaken; forty qualitative, semi-structured inter-
views were conducted. The sample size of respondents interviewed allowed
for a diversity of views and experiences to be canvassed." The intention
was to build a "solid empirical basis" for the article.1 2 The diversity of ac-
tors interviewed provided multiple perspectives and also functioned to con-
trol bias. Interviews were generally forty-five minutes to one hour in
duration. Interviews were conducted with representatives of bilateral and
multilateral donor agencies. Transitional justice actors (including staff of
the Solomon Islands TRC, justice sector agencies, police and corrections),
Solomon Islands Government ("SIG") officials and civil society actors (in-
ternational, national and "grassroots") were also interviewed.' 3 The focus
was on interviewing people who engaged in the transitional justice sphere
in Solomon Islands. Aid program documentation was also reviewed.
Drawing on the methodology of a study undertaken by Petersen et al.
on transitional justice aid to Guatemala and Rwanda, emphasis was placed
10. Duthie, supra note 1, at 292.
I1. See A CASE FOR THE CASE STUDY 10 (Joe R Feagin et al., eds., 1991).
12. Id. at 7.
13. In this article, the names of informants are only used where express permis-
sion was given to do so. Otherwise, as provided in the approved Human Ethics Com-
mittee (HEC) protocol 15164, either the informant's institutional or sector affiliation is
indicated, or comments are anonymised. Interviews were audio-recorded where agreed
by the informant, according to HEC protocol 15164. Where the name of the interviewee
is used in the article, they were provided with a copy of the interview transcript to
amend. Additional to ethics approval granted by the University of Sydney Human Eth-




on accessing data that demonstrated "the magnitude, origins, distribution,
and sequencing of the transitional justice assistance, and the motivations,
priorities and strategies of the involved donors." 4 The topics of the inter-
views and interview questions centred on how, and how well, transitional
justice aid had worked. In the study by Petersen et al., interviews were
conducted with representatives of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.
Different from Petersen et al., however, the research methodology for this
article also allowed capturing of perspectives of civil society and transi-
tional justice actors on the relevance and effectiveness of transitional justice
aid.
III. CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AID
To TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Internationally, transitional justice has been "an area of significant do-
nor engagement" for almost two decades.' 5 Yet as Petersen et al. highlight,
"little is known about the scope, trends and experiences of that engage-
ment," nor of the motivations and strategies among donors guiding engage-
ment.1 6 The same authors also suggest a "virtual absence of knowledge
about how and how well this type of aid works".' 7 Notably, it seems that the
international aid community has generally not evaluated the effects or im-
pacts of their transitional justice aid on the lives of the intended "benefi-
ciaries."'8 Hellsten similarly identifies a lack of "empirical studies and firm
evidence" in this space.1 9 Lenzen points to the limited engagement of devel-
opment theory with transitional justice. 20 And there has been only limited
attention internationally to how aid and development effectiveness princi-
ples apply to the work of development actors operating in the transitional
justice sphere. This "scarcity of academic knowledge" on transitional jus-
tice aid is somewhat of a "paradox" given the "enormous growth" of litera-
14. Petersen et al., supra note 8, at 440.
15. Id. at 439.
16. Id. at 439-40.
17. Id. at 441.
18. Colleen Duggan, Editiorial Note, 4 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 315
(2010).
19. Sirkku K. Hellsten, Transitional Justice and Aid 2 (U.N. Univ. World Inst. for
Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2012/06, 2012).
20. Marcus Lenzen, Roads Less Traveled? Conceptual Pathways (and Stumbling
Blocks) for Development and Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DE-
VELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS 76, 77 (Pablo De Greiff & Roger Duthie eds.,
2009).
2014-2015]1 8 1
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ture on transitional justice in recent decades. 2 1 By assessing the
effectiveness of aid to transitional justice in Solomon Islands and demon-
strating how transitional justice and development intersect in that context,
this article contributes to filling that knowledge gap.
Certainly much has been written about the civil conflict in Solomon
Islands 22 and the peacebuilding process, including RAMSI.23 There has also
been some rigorous analysis of foreign aid directed to Solomon Islands to
rebuild in the aftermath of the Tensions, including rule of law development
assistance, 24 as well as some high-quality analysis of transitional justice
measures implemented in Solomon Islands. 25 However, foreign aid to tran-
sitional justice in Solomon Islands has not been thoroughly assessed, de-
spite significant donor engagement in the transitional justice sphere in
Solomon Islands over the past decade. 26 Certainly "exploring how transi-
21. Petersen et al., supra note 8, at 441; see, e.g., Leigh A. Payne, Tricia D. Olsen,
& Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice Data Base, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE DATA
BASE PROJECT, https://sites.google.com/site/transitionaljusticedatabase/home (contain-
ing an extensive bibliography of transitional justice literature).
22. See, e.g., CLIVE MOORE, HAPPY ISLES IN CRISIS: THE HISTORICAL CAUSES FOR
A FAILING STATE IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, 1998-2004 (2004); KENILOREA, supra note 7.
23. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6; Dinnen, Porter & Sage, supra
note 7.
24. See, e.g., MARCUS Cox, EMELE DUITUTURAGA & ERIC SCHEYE, AUSTRALIAN
AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., OFFICE OF DEv. EFFECTIVENESS, SOLOMON ISLANDS CASE
STUDY: EVALUATION OF AUSTRALIAN LAW AND JUSTICE ASSISTANCE (2012); SINCLAIR
DINNEN & NICOLE HALEY, WORLD BANK JUSTICE FOR THE POOR PROGRAM, EVALUA-
TION OF THE COMMUNITY OFFICER PROJECT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS (2012); BRAITHWAITE
ET AL., supra note 6.
25. Jeffery, supra note 6; Louise Vella, "What Will You Do with Our Stories?"
Truth and Reconciliation in the Solomon Islands, 8 Int'l J. Conflict & Violence 1
(2014); Kenneth H. Averre, The Tension Trials - A Defence Lawyer's Perspective of
Post Conflict Intervention in Solomon Islands (State Society and Governance in Mela-
nesia Program, Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific, Re-
search School for Pacific and Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 2008/3, 2008); Susan
Harris-Rimmer, Building Democracy and Justice after Conflict: Working Paper No. 4:
The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Australian National Uni-
versity, 2010).
26. Note, however, that various donors have conducted/commissioned some inter-
nal and independent reviews of their transitional justice aid. For example, a review was
conducted (presented in the form of a final project report) of the International Support
Facility to the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The review,
however, does not involve substantial detail and critical reflection on the effectiveness
of the TRC and corresponding aid, functioning largely as an overview of the Facility.
Further, internal and independent reviews and evaluations of RAMSI's support for
criminal prosecutions and institutional reform have been conducted. Yet these do not
82 [Vol. 21
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tional justice works" is very different from understanding how aid to the
field of transitional justice works. 27
Fieldwork in Solomon Islands indicated varied understanding among
development practitioners of the relevance of transitional justice to develop-
ment and poverty reduction, and their role in supporting transitional justice.
Fieldwork research also uncovered an uneven understanding and prioritisa-
tion of the various transitional justice measures among development practi-
tioners. Criminal justice and institutional reform were generally better
understood and more familiar to development actors than were reparations
or the TRC. Logically this has implications for how, how well, and the
extent to which aid is provided in support of the different transitional justice
measures.
That fact that "the reach of the transitional justice industry is uneven,"
with the majority of transitional justice measures having been implemented
in Latin America and Africa,2 8 means that the bulk of transitional justice
aid, and corresponding analysis, has focused on those geographic regions. 2 9
Yet more recently there has been an increased uptake in, and a crescendo in
the discourse around, transitional justice across the Asia-Pacific region. 30
Analysis of the field's geographic expansion and evolution is valuable: to
capture trends, facilitate original cross-regional comparisons, and spark in-
tercontinental conversations and negotiations. Further, the dearth of transi-
contemplate nor situate RAMSI support within the broader array of transitional justice
measures implemented in Solomon Islands such as truth-seeking and reparations
measures.
27. Petersen et al., supra note 8, at 441.
28. PAUL GREADY, THE ERA OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE AFTERMATH OF THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BEYOND 7 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Petersen et al., supra note 8; Hellsten, surpa note 19. These contem-
plate transitional justice aid to Africa and Latin America and not to the Pacific.
30. See, e.g., Patrick Burgess & Galub Wandita, Rethinking Transitional Justice:
Lessons from Asia and the Pacific, Seminar for the State, Society and Governance in
Melanesia Program (SSGM), ANU College of Asia & the Pacific (July 15, 2013). Ex-
amples of transitional justice measures implemented in the Asia-Pacific region include
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Khmer Rouge Tribunal),
the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR - the
Portuguese acronym) and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes within the Dili District
Court, and all transitional justice processes and mechanisms implemented in Solomon
Islands. Further, in February 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights
situation in Myanmar, Tombs Ojea Quintana called for a truth commission for My-
anmar. Some actors have also canvassed the idea of truth commissions for Bougain-
ville, Papua New Guinea and Mindanao, Philippines.
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tional justice data, research, and analysis pertaining to the Pacific 3 1 is
evident, and points to the relevance of research assessing transitional justice
aid in the Pacific. Similarly, transitional justice data pertaining to Small
Island Developing States is limited.32 Solomon Islands, as the first Pacific
island country to systematically engage with transitional justice (which has
been predominantly donor-funded), holds the prospect of offering critical
lessons for transitional justice and development practice.
IV. DEFINITIONS
Lenzen explains that both transitional justice and development may be
understood as "discourses, as communities of practice, as conceptual
fields." 33 Neither concept has a universally agreed upon definition, both are
"contested territories with diverging bodies of (at least emerging) theory,
policy, and practice." 34 Yet what both fields share in common is illuminat-
ing-"both are process-orientated fields in the sense that they are concerned
with [positive] change toward improving human lives and societies."35
A. Defining Transitional Justice and Transitional Justice Aid
Despite the absence of a universally agreed-upon definition, in this
article transitional justice refers to "the set of judicial and non-judicial mea-
sures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress
the legacies of massive human rights abuses." 36 The UN articulates the aims
of transitional justice as being "to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation." 37 These measures include criminal prosecutions,
31. TRICIA D. OLSEN, LEIGH A. PAYNE & ANDREw G. REITER, TRANSITIONAL Jus-
TICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY (2010).
32. Id.
33. Lenzen, supra note 20, at 77.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. What is Transitional justice?, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JusT. ("ICTJ"),
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (2014). Note that the ICTJ's definition of transi-
tional justice draws on and reflects ideas from a range of definitions of the term. For
example, it aligns with (at least the first clause of) the United Nations' defintion of the
term as "the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempt
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accounta-
bility, serve justice and achieve reconciliation." Further, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter sug-
gest in their book, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES,
WEIGHING EFFICACY, that scholars are increasingly adopting the definition elaborated
by the ICTJ. OLSEN, PAYNE & REITER, supra note 31.
37. U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice: Guidance
Note of the Secretary-General 2 (March 2010).
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truth commissions, reparations, institutional reform and mechanisms for lo-
cal and traditional, or customary justice. There is, however, no consensus
on the precise scope of transitional justice, that is, which measures do and
do not fall within the ambit of transitional justice.38
There is also debate as to whether commemorative practices and edu-
cation reforms (incorporating learning of past atrocities into school curric-
ula) constitute transitional justice. 39 This article classifies both as
transitional justice since they are forms of reparation pursuant to the UN's
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 40 Some contemplate
a broader array of measures still, with some commentators including
amnesties in the list of transitional justice measures. 4 1 This article does not
count amnesties as a transitional justice measure, drawing on Freeman's
work. 42
The five transitional justice measures studied in this article are the
same five that Petersen et al. assess in their study of transitional justice aid
to Guatemala and Rwanda. Analysing the same five measures more easily
facilitates comparisons across case studies, adding to the body of knowl-
edge about transitional justice aid. This analysis also adopts the definition
of transitional justice aid put forward by Petersen et al. in their study: "for-
eign economic assistance provided to support mechanisms of transitional
justice." 43
Including mechanisms for customary justice in the itemisation of tran-
sitional justice measures is a relatively recent trend in the field's trajectory
and has not been picked up by all. Scholars including Petersen et al.,44
Mani,45 Allen and Macdonald, 46 and Jeffery 47 contemplate local and tradi-
38. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra
note 1; Paul Gready, Telling Truth? The Methodological Challenges of Truth Commis-
sions, in METHODS OF HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH (Fons Coomans et al., eds., 2009).
39. Gready, supra note 38.
40. G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Ba-
sic Principles and Guidelines].
41. See, e.g., Andrew G. Reiter, Tricia D. Olsen & Leigh A. Payne, Transitional
Justice and Civil War: Exploring New Pathways, Challenging Old Guideposts, I TRAN-
SITIONAL JUST. REV. 137, 140 (2012); Jeffery, supra note 6.
42. MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUS-
TICE 10-11 (2009).
43. Petersen et al., supra note 8, at 442.
44. Id.
45. RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF
WAR (2002).
2014-2015] 85
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
tional justice mechanisms as falling within the bounds of transitional jus-
tice, being an important means of local conflict resolution. 48 For Solomon
Islands in particular, consideration of customary practices (such as tradi-
tional reconciliation ceremonies) is valuable for a study of how the country
has come to terms with past abuses. This is because reconciliation plays a
large part in local custom 4 9 and many Solomon Islanders access justice lo-
cally and through customary practices, outside of state justice structures.5 0
This role was made clear in fieldwork interviews, with many respondents
flagging it.
Lack of consensus on the bounds of transitional justice contributes to
the ambiguity around its definition. This has been compounded by the fact
that that the focus of transitional justice has evolved and shifted since its
inception. Originally, transitional justice was concerned with political tran-
sitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, its application being to redress
past atrocities of "repressive predecessor regimes" in periods of political
change or "flux." 5' Due to its focus on justice within the context of "transi-
tions to democracy," the field came to be termed transitional justice. 52 Over
the past two decades, however, transitional justice measures have been ap-
propriated to respond to contexts of conflict, political strife, human rights
atrocities, and more generally, expanding the gaze of transitional justice. 53
Transitional justice measures are now implemented in societies even where
there has been no regime change or political transition to speak of.54 In
46. Tim Allen & Anna Macdonald, Post-Conflict Traditional Justice: A Critical
Overview (London Sch. of Econ., Just. & Security. Res. Program, Paper No. 3, 2013).
47. Jeffery, supra note 6.




50. MATTHEw ALLEN ET AL., WORLD BANK JUSTICE FOR THE POOR PROGRAM,
JUSTICE DELIVERED LOCALLY: SYSTEMS, CHALLENGES, AND INNOVATIONS IN SOLOMON
ISLANDS (2013)
51. Reiter, Olsen and Payne, supra note 41; Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Gen-
ealogy, 16 HARv. Hum. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003).
52. What is Transitional justice?, supra note 36.
53. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004); U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/
2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011).
54. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guar-
antees of Non-recurrence, First Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promo-
[Vol. 2186
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Solomon Islands, the focus is on justice in the context of transitioning from
violence and conflict to peace.
B. Defining "Development"
The term might be understood, as international development law
scholar Sarkar suggests, according to its objectives of "alleviating poverty
and human suffering and of improving the human condition."15 This article
similarly draws on a broad understanding of development, articulated by
Sen, Nussbaum, and other theorists, that accounts for "equity issues ... and
the need for a more 'human-centred' paradigm."5 6 This conception is pre-
ferred to that which Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky describe as a "narrowly
defined process of economic development," focused on such indicators as
gross domestic product and foreign direct investment.57 Undoubtedly eco-
nomic growth is important for development, and low income has been
found to heighten the risk of internal armed conflict.58 Moreover, Collier's
research evidences the importance of the economy in post-conflict societies:
higher income levels and a faster rate of economic growth are associated
with a lower risk of relapse into conflict. 59 Rather, the point is that a defini-
tion of development solely focused on economic growth is inadequate. 60
Sen's articulation of development is particularly relevant and illuminating,
"as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy," through
the creation of the conditions for all people to develop their full range of
capabilities.6' Uvin interprets "freedom" as Sen uses the term, to denote the
tion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff,
U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/46 (Aug. 9, 2012).
55. RUMu SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, HUMAN
RIGHTS, & GLOBAL FINANCE xvi (2009).
56. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 185 (2011); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999); Chris
Huggins, Linking Broad Constellations of Ideas: Transitional Justice, Land Tenure Re-
form, and Development, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CON-
NECTIONS, supra note 1, at 332, 338; see also Lenzen, supra note 20, at 77-78.
57. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Katharine Orlovsky, A Complementary Relationship:
Reparations and Development, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING
CONNECTIONS, supra note 1, at 171, 172-73.
58. PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 17 (2008).
59. PAUL COLLIER, CONFLICT, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND AID 100-01
(2011).
60. JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVEL-
OPMENT AND CIVILIZATION 185 (1996).
61. SEN, supra note 56.
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full enjoyment of human rights. 6 2 Uvin's reading of Sen is persuasive and
relevant for the field of transitional justice, its purpose being to remedy
rights abuses.
V. WHAT ARE THE LINKS BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT?
A. Three Ways in Which Transitional Justice and Development Connect
In Solomon Islands, transitional justice has been pursued in the context
of transitioning from armed conflict to peace. As Duthie explains, transi-
tional justice is never "pursued in a vacuum" but within a "broader transi-
tional and peace-building context"-in Solomon Islands, one of the
elements of this context is development. 63 Within this context, we can iden-
tify three overarching ways in which transitional justice and development
connect. First, transitional justice and development may share common
long-term goals such as "the rule of law, respect for human rights, democra-
tization, good governance and peace."" It would seem logical, therefore,
that those initiatives geared towards achieving shared goals in any given
context coordinate, or at least contemplate and speak to each other, to cap-
ture and facilitate synergy. In this vein, Lenzen suggests that transitional
justice-as a means of coming to terms with past human rights violations-
"can be of instrumental value to larger development goals' in post-conflict
societies." 65 This is because, as Lenzen explains:
If we accept that transitional justice is concerned with how to restore
trust and confidence between the state and its citizens, then develop-
ment actors involved in the process of state building and strengthen-
ing (democratic) governance institutions have a reason to be
interested in and seek to understand transitional justice.66
This quotation invokes some of the key ways in which the concerns of
development and transitional justice intersect. It also points up why transi-
tional justice may be interesting to development actors; valuable where so-
cial divisions and distrust persist after conflict.
Second, most armed conflicts and severe violence today occur in de-
veloping countries.6 7 This generates a corresponding need for justice in re-
62. PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 124 (2004).
63. Duthie, supra note 1, at 293.
64. Id. at 294.
65. Lenzen, supra note 20, at 79-80.
66. Id. at 80.
67. Duthie, supra note 1, at 295.
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sponse to harm suffered in those contexts. While poverty, inequality and
underdevelopment may not alone cause conflict and rights violations, they
can be "contributing or enabling factors." 68 Therefore, transitional justice
and development will very commonly be pursued in the same setting,
concurrently.
Third, conflict and violence can be disastrous for a country's develop-
ment.69 By way of example, average poverty rates are twenty-one percent
higher in countries that experienced violence between 1981 and 2005.70
Poverty reduction is slower in countries affected by major violence, with
poverty increasing in some countries affected by violence, despite poverty
being on the decline for much of the world. 7' Transitional justice is one tool
that may contribute to ending cycles of conflict and violence that are under-
stood to impede development.72
B. Development-Sensitive Transitional Justice Measures
Duthie argues that transitional justice measures should be "develop-
ment-sensitive"; 73 this author agrees. A development-sensitive approach to
transitional justice involves addressing "development issues"-poverty, in-
equality, natural resources, land, education, health, governance and eco-
nomic and social rights-through transitional justice.7 4 That is to say, that
transitional justice measures should be designed and implemented in such a
way as to contribute to achieving positive development outcomes. In Solo-
mon Islands, foreign aid donors have provided significant support to transi-
tional justice, and in so doing have greatly influenced its trajectory. As
such, it might reasonably be said that a development-sensitive approach to
transitional justice was, and is, at least possible for informing transitional
justice aid. In this way, Duthie has identified a significant opportunity for
development actors: to leverage their aid to transitional justice in support of
broader development outcomes.
68. Roger Duthie, Introduction, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT:
MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 1, at 17, 19; Collier, supra note 58, at 5; WAR,
HUNGER, AND DISPLACEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 2
(Wayne Nafziger et al., eds., 2000).
69. Duthie, supra note 1, at 295.
70. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT, SECURITY,
AND DEVELOPMENT 60 (2011).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Duthie, supra note 1.
74. Id. at 292-94.
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C. Why Might Foreign Aid Donors Support Transitional Justice?
It is not the purpose of this article to argue that international develop-
ment agencies should always support and engage with transitional justice.
As with all development assistance, decisions about how and whether to
engage with the various transitional justice measures in a given country
should be informed by rigorous cost-benefit analysis, considering the bene-
fits of supporting various transitional justice measures against the costs of
refraining from doing so, as well as thorough analysis of the political econ-
omy. The focus should be on politically feasible development assistance,
imbued with realistic expectations of what can be achieved according to
context, including the political and security environment, the timescale, and
the risks involved. 75 A sober analysis of the level of political will and ca-
pacity for implementation of each of the transitional justice measures is
key.
Further, transitional justice measures can be costly-this is relevant
against a backdrop where decision-makers are faced with dilemmas of
where to allocate resources. 76 Boettke and Coyne articulate the opportunity
cost to investing resources in transitional justice in contexts of un-
derdevelopment: "investing resources in the administration of justice means
that those resources are diverted away from other transition activities that
can also yield a future stream of benefits." 7 7 And importantly, as Duthie
suggests, these opportunity costs are most significant in less developed
countries where there is greater scarcity of public resources as well as
greater need78-certainly a relevant consideration for development pro-
gramming in Solomon Islands. That is to say, aid directed in support of
transitional justice in Solomon Islands might alternatively have been di-
rected to, for example, health, education, food security or humanitarian re-
lief. The point being that scarcity of public resources limits the options for
transitional societies "for the advancement of political, social, and eco-
nomic reforms required for the consolidation of . .. social development." 79
75. See, e.g., CLAIRE MCLOUGHLIN, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT RE-
SOURCE CENTRE (GSDRC), TOPIC GUIDE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS (2012),
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/PEA.pdf.
76. Duthie, supra note 1, at 295.
77. Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne, The Political Economy of Forgive-
ness: The Necessity of Post-Atrocity Reconciliation, 44(2) Soc'Y 53, 55 (2007).
78. Duthie, supra note 1, at 298; Alexander Segovia, Financing Reparations Pro-
grams: Reflections from International Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS
657 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
79. Segovia, supra note 78, at 650.
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The intention here is to raise some of the questions that development
practitioners should consider for their transitional justice aid. There is an
increasing uptake in transitional measures throughout the world,s0 many of
which are implemented in violence and conflict-affected developing coun-
try contexts.8 ' To maximise transitional justice's potential, there is a need to
get aid to transitional justice right-this is an ongoing challenge. In recent
years, aid agencies have come to direct substantial financial and technical
assistance in support of transitional justice. 82 This has occurred as transi-
tional justice has come to be understood as a key peacebuilding tool in the
aftermath of armed conflict and violence.83 It is now counted by the interna-
tional community among the "emerging set of pro-peace policy prescrip-
tions" along with peacekeeping, economic recovery, and state building,
among others. 84
So why is transitional justice important, how might it help a post-con-
flict country such as Solomon Islands, and why would aid donors be inter-
ested in it? Transitional justice is now considered "critical" to remedy
"troublesome histories."8 It is presumed to provide the truth about past
violations, accountability for perpetrators, justice, hope and recognition for
victims, 8 6 reconciliation and healing 8 7-and through this, "deterrence, 'rule
80. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 6 (2d ed., 2011) (pointing to an increasing
uptake in truth and reconciliation commissions throughout the world); James Goldston,
Guatemala at the Cross Roads in Search for Justice, OPEN Soc'v JUST. INITIATIVE
(Mar. 19, 2013) (highlighting increasing human rights prosecutions in Latin America),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/guatemala-cross-roads-search-justice.
81. Duthie, supra note 1.
82. Petersen et al., supra note 8.
83. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Socie-
ties: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, supra note 53, at Y[ 3; see
also GALTUNG, supra note 60, at 270.
84. Petersen at al., supra note 8, at 441.
85. Id.
86. First Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth,
Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, supra note 54, at 3; The Rule
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, supra note 53, at 3.
87. See, e.g., U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice: Guidance Note of the Secre-
tary-General, supra note 37; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, supra
note 53; HAYNER, supra note 80; LIA KENT, THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL MODELS AND LOCAL REALITIES IN EAST TIMOR (2012); RUT] G. TEI-
TEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
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of law' and less violence,"88 although the empirical evidence base for some
of these claims is limited.8 9 These outcomes speak to the significant uptake
of transitional justice across the globe, including its piquing of donor
interest.90
Transitional justice matters because victims of massive human rights
atrocities have the right to see perpetrators brought to justice, to know the
truth, and to receive reparations. 91 The following quotation brings to light
the importance of transitional justice:
A history of unaddressed massive abuses is likely to be socially divi-
sive, to generate mistrust between groups and in the institutions of the
State, and to hamper or slow down the achievement of security and
development goals. It raises questions about the commitment to the
rule of law and, ultimately, can lead to cyclical recurrence of violence
in various forms. As it is seen in most countries where massive
human rights violations take place, the claims of justice refuse to "go
away." 92
These words bring into focus transitional justice's role in fostering trust
between groups and in the state and its institutions. 931n turn, this develops
resilience to violence and better peace outcomes. 94
The above quotation also brings into focus transitional justice's likely
contribution to development and security in the aftermath of atrocity; fail-
ing to remedy past abuses risks insecurity and underdevelopment. As Den-
ney explains, security, and increasingly, justice are now seen as
prerequisites for development.95
88. Petersen et al., supra note 8, at 441.
89. JANE ALEXANDER, DEP'T FOR INT'L DEv., A SCOPING STUDY OF TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE AND POVERTY REDUCTION: FINAL, REPORT, 2003 (U.K.); Eric Brahm,
Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact, 8 INT'L
STUD. PERSP. 1 (2007); Geoff Dancy et al., The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commis-
sion Experimentation, 9 J. HUM. RTs. 4; Duggan, supra note 18.
90. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Socie-
ties: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, supra note 53; The Rule
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634, supra note 53.
91. What is Transitional justice?, supra note 36. The international legal bases for
each of these rights are set out below.
92. Id.
93. WORLD BANK, supra note 70.
94. Id.
95. LISA DENNEY, JUSTICE AND SECURITY REFORM: DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND




The link between transitional justice and security is notable and may
further motivate donors to support transitional justice. Firth argues that gov-
ernment donors, especially Australia, see their development assistance to
the Pacific Islands as contributing to regional "security, stability[,] and co-
hesion." 96 He asserts that "trouble in the Pacific generates aid to the Pacific"
such that transitional justice aid may serve a dual function for donors as
both a "security instrument" and a "mechanism intended to improve devel-
opment outcomes."9 7 In this way, to the extent that transitional justice can
reduce insecurity, it may interest donors that have strategic interests in a
given country's security and stability.
While the above paragraphs describe the importance of transitional
justice and its potential for social change, it is not the intention to downplay
the complex challenges that it faces. Transitional justice is not a panacea for
poverty, inequality and underdevelopment, though it may help. Transitional
justice measures are imperfect and often flawed, fraught with resource con-
straints and a lack of moral or political capital. 98 In Duggan's words:
"[a]cknowledging and atoning for the systematic abuse of human rights and
for violations of international humanitarian law is arguably one of the most
controversial, complex and unpredictable processes undertaken by govern-
ments and citizens" In societies in transition.9 9 Transitional justice measures
are difficult to implement well. For example, they may face problems of
local legitimacy and unrealistic expectations of what transitional justice can
deliver, particularly over a short timeframe.'" Aid and the international
community can, to a degree, help respond to and overcome some of these
challenges but equally can interfere and do harm. Globally, experiences
with transitional justice demonstrate the complex challenges that it faces
and how hard it is to get right.o'0 Part VIII unpacks some shortcomings of
transitional justice in Solomon Islands, and the role of foreign aid donors.
96. Stewart Firth, Opening Up to Our Pacific Neighbours II (State Society and
Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National University College of Asia and
the Pacific, Working Paper No. 2014/4, 2014).
97. Id.
98. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2.
99. Duggan, supra note 18.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., THIERRY CRUVELLIER, THE MASTER OF CONFESSIONS: THE MAKING
OF A KHMER ROUGE TORTURER (2014); Evelyne Asaala & Nicole Dicker, Transitional
Justice in Kenya and the UN Special Rapporteur on Truth and Justice: Where to From
Here?, 13(2) AFR. Hum. RTs. L.J. 324, 327 (2013); Evelyne Asaala & Nicole Dicker,
Truth-seeking in Kenya: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Truth, Justice and Reconcili-
ation Commission of Kenya, 1(2) Ava. NAZARENE UNIV. L. J. 133 (2013); Susan Kemp,
Guatemala Prosecutes former President Rios Montt, 12 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 133
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VI. CONTEXT OF TRANSITION, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND AID IN SOLOMON ISLANDS
A. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Violations
Much has been written analysing the causes and consequences of the
Tensions.1 02 Therefore, this article focuses only (and very briefly) on the
human rights and international humanitarian law violations of the Tensions
to which transitional justice responds. The TRC, in its final report, identi-
fied six categories of rights violations as most prevalent during the conflict:
killings, abductions/illegal detentions, torture/ill-treatment, sexual violence,
property violations and forced displacements.1 03 These violations were com-
mitted by all armed groups party to the conflict, including police and mili-
tants.'" The TRC also found that the Tensions impacted the enjoyment of
economic and social rights. In particular, the rights to work, to access edu-
cation, and to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health were limited;
this was due to a decline in public spending as the economy collapsed,
destruction of health clinics and schools, forced displacement, and closure
of businesses. 0
(2014); Jo-Marie Burt & Geoff Thale, The Guatemala Genocide Case: Using the Legal
System to Defeat Justice, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM., June 5, 2013, http://wola.org/
commentary/the-guatemala-genocide case usingthe_1egal-systemjto-defeat-justice.
102. See, e.g., MATTHEw ALLEN, GREED AND GRIEVANCE: Ex-MILITANTS' PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE CONFLICT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, 1998-2003 (2013); BRAITHWAITE et
al., supra note 6; RICHARD CARTER, IN SEARCH OF THE LOST: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
SEVEN PEACEMAKERS OF THE MELANESIAN BROTHERHOOD (2006); KENILOREA, supra
note 7; MOORE, supra note 22; Judith Fangalasuu et al., Herem Kam: Stori Blong
Mifala Olketa Mere, Women's Submission to the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission (2011); JON FRAENKEL, THE MANIPULATION OF CUSTOM: FROM UP-
RISING TO INTERVENTION IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS (2004); RUTH LILOQULA & ALICE
ARUHE'ETA POLLARD, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS: A PRACTICAL
MEANS TO PEACEMAKING (2000); SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMM'N, supra note 6; Dinnen, Porter, & Sage, supra note 7; Tarcisius Tara Kabutau-
laka, Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in Solomon
Islands (State Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National Uni-
versity College of Asia and the Pacific, Working Paper No. 2001/01, 2001); Debra
McDougall & Joy Kere, Christianity, Custom, and Law: Conflict and Peacemaking in
the Postconflict Solomon Islands, in MEADIATING ACROSS DIFFERENCE: OCEANIC AND
ASIAN APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Morgan Brigg & Roland Bleiker eds.,
2011).





As it relates to violations of international humanitarian law committed
during the Tensions, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 applies. 106 Common Article 3 prohibits violence to life and person, in
particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hos-
tages; and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment.'0 7 There is evidence to suggest that during the Tensions,
armed groups committed each of the above-listed prohibited acts against
non-combatants. 0 8 These acts therefore constituted violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law. It is these human rights and humanitarian law vio-
lations that frame and drive transitional justice in Solomon Islands.
B. The Inception of Transitional Justice
As the Tensions devastated Solomon Islands, there were various at-
tempts to broker peace. Local civil society actors-churches, women's
groups, and non-governmental organisations-played an important peace-
mediation and peace-making role. 0 9 Additionally, throughout 1999 and
early 2000, the Commonwealth Secretariat facilitated negotiation of several
peace agreements."10 These efforts, however, "failed to stem growing mili-
tancy.""' In response, the Australian and New Zealand Governments co-
hosted the Townsville Peace Conference in October 2000, at which the
Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed. Conclusion of the TPA
marked the inception of transitional justice in Solomon Islands. The TPA
called for various transitional justice-related processes, including constitu-
106. Prosecutor v. Tadix, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Tadix, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Judgment, [ 562 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). It is asserted that the Tensions reached
the threshold of an internal armed conflict for the application of international humanita-
rian law, applying the definition first set out in the Tadia case in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The intensity of the hostilities and organ-
isation of the parties to the conflict in Solomon Islands were such as to trigger applica-
tion of Common Article 3. For further discussion of this point, see Solomon Islands
Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n, supra note 6.
107. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
108. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6.
109. Note that these civil society actors have continued to play an important role
in Solomon Islands' transition to peace, and project of transitional justice.
110. Dinnen, Porter & Sage, supra note 7.
Ill. Id. at 11.
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tional reform,1 12 investigation of land and property claims,1 3 payment of
custom means of compensation,' 14 identification of the remains of missing
persons," 5 and reconciliation." 6
A significant shortcoming of the Townsville Peace Conference was
that it excluded women from the negotiations, despite the active role of
women's groups in local peace-making. This ran contrary to provisions in
UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, requiring the adop-
tion of a gender perspective when negotiating peace agreements.' '7 This
was compounded by there being no mention in the TPA of the needs or
experiences of women and girls affected by the conflict, nor recognition of
local women's peace initiatives for conflict resolution. Exclusion of women
from peace negotiations is arguably at the root of why transitional justice in
Solomon Islands has failed to adequately respond to and remedy women's
harrowing experiences of conflict, including sexual violence.
Despite conclusion of the TPA, between the end of 2000 and mid-
2003, there was an escalation of lawlessness and rise in organised crime in
Solomon Islands; by 2003, it was clear that SIG was unable to restore peace
in Solomon Islands without international assistance." 8 Following repeated
calls by SIG for Australian and New Zealand assistance, and the initial re-
luctance of both the Australian and New Zealand Governments, on June 30,
2003, the Pacific Island Forum leaders approved RAMSI, which mobilised
as a coalition of 15 Pacific Island nations on July 24, 2003."9
RAMSI was mandated to: (1) ensure the safety and security of Solo-
mon Islands; (2) repair and reform the machinery of government, improve
government accountability, and improve the delivery of services in urban
and provincial areas; (3) improve economic governance and strengthen the
government's financial systems; (4) help rebuild the economy and en-
112. Townsville Peace Agreement, Solomon Islands Government, pt. 4(1), Oct.
15, 2000.
113. Id. at pt. 4(3).
114. Id. at pt. 3(1)(b).
115. Id. at pt. 3(1)(a).
116. Id. at pt. 5.
117. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
118. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 50, at 11-12.
119. Id.; Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 20. Pacific Island Fo-
rum countries participating in RAMSI include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States
of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
[Vol. 2196
Aiding Transitional Justice
courage sustainable broad-based growth; and (5) build strong and peaceful
communities. 120
Points one and five of the mandate are most relevant to RAMSI's en-
gagement with transitional justice. It was RAMSI that stimulated and de-
fined criminal justice and institutional reform efforts in Solomon Islands.
Jeffery labels this approach, "favoured by RAMSI," the "rule of law" ap-
proach, according to which "large numbers of militants on both sides were
arrested and processed through the criminal justice system[,] resulting, in
many cases, in the imposition of lengthy periods of imprisonment."' 2 1 The
following quotation captures the crux of this approach:
Conceiving justice through the prism of its liberal state-building man-
date, RAMSI's rule of law approach was, and remains, a top-down
approach that favours the strengthening of key state institutions, in-
cluding those associated with law and order, and the pursuit of ac-
countability through criminal trials.1 22
This "rule of law" approach to transitional justice was devised and funded
by RAMSI, largely Australia, and to a lesser degree, New Zealand.
Braithwaite et al. similarly point to RAMSI's bringing with it an "unusually
strong rule-of-law agenda," focused on restoring and strengthening the
criminal justice system.1 23
By way of contrast, Jeffery identifies a "reconciliation" approach to
transitional justice-a "bottom-up method" of transitional justice-which
"favoured local, grassroots, traditional and indigenous justice processes."
This bottom-up method was generally implemented, owned and directed by
community groups, women's organisations and churches, with no or very
little donor engagement. The TRC functioned as a "bridge," or third way,
between these two divergent approaches.1 24 On the one hand, the TRC was
closely connected with local churches and incorporated aspects of tradi-
tional Solomon Islands reconciliation processes. Yet on the other hand, the
TRC was a donor-funded, international human rights model, transposed to
Solomon Islands from elsewhere.1 25 This throws up vexed questions of
120. RAMSI, supra note 9. RAMSI's mandate was initially articulated in the
Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon Islands: Proposed Scope and
Requirements.
121. Jeffery, supra note 6.
122. Id. at 154.
123. BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
124. Jeffery, supra note 6.
125. Note that some forty official truth commissions (the precise number depen-
dent upon the definition to which one subscribes) have been set up for peacebuilding
purposes throughout the world. See HAYNER, supra note 80. The Solomon Islands TRC
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ownership of transitional justice in Solomon Islands and brings into ques-
tion the relevance of transitional justice and transitional justice aid in Solo-
mon Islands.
C. Development Context
1. The Donors and Funding Amounts
A range of donors have supported transitional justice in Solomon Is-
lands: the main bilateral donors include Australia (through RAMSI and
Australia's bilateral aid program), New Zealand (through RAMSI and New
Zealand's bilateral aid program) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Tai-
wan). Multilateral donors include the European Union and the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP). The World Bank, while not adopting
the terminology of transitional justice, is providing assistance to the law and
justice sector to strengthen policing and access to justice at the local level.
For Solomon Islands, it is not possible to determine the precise fund-
ing amounts directed in support of transitional justice. This is in part be-
cause aid to transitional justice is intertwined with other peacebuilding,
governance, law and order, and institutional strengthening programs imple-
mented under RAMSI and by the UN.1 26 We saw earlier that there is no
universally agreed definition of transitional justice; this, then, has method-
ological implications for tracking transitional justice aid. Further, donors
are not sufficiently transparent in reporting levels of financing so as to be
able to accurately calculate transitional justice aid funding amounts. Where
donors have reported funding amounts, transitional justice aid has not been
disaggregated from broader governance and rule of law development assis-
tance. Total funding for transitional justice in Solomon Islands is very
roughly estimated at approximately 245 million USD between 2000 and
2013, broken down as follows:
drew on these experiences from outside of the Pacific, in particular the cases of South
Africa, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.
126. Hellsten, supra note 19, makes this point, relevant to transitional justice aid
in Africa and globally. This is the total cost of the RAMSI Law and Justice Program
and includes the cost of all support for the Tension Trials as well as institutional reform
of corrections and the judicial system. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at
84. In recognition (and to balance potential criticism) that not all would agree with the
categorisation of the RAMSI Law and Justice Program funding as all constituting tran-
sitional justice aid, the total transitional justice figure calculated does not take into ac-
count ODA eligible expenditure on policing.
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RAMSI (predominantly Australia and
Criminal justice New Zealand; Taiwan funded one
international judge) 215,900,000*
RAMSI (predominantly Australia andInstitutional reform NwZaad
New Zealand)




technical assistance EU 800,000
(ICTJ)
Reparations Taiwan 25,000,000
Local and traditional JNDP; RAMSI 20,000***justice
245,491,047









These tables make clear the significant difference in levels of aid provided
for "top-down," retributive justice measures, and the comparably limited
support for bottom-up, restorative justice. The large funding amounts di-
rected in support of transitional justice in Solomon Islands further under-
score the importance of this research.
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2. Transitional Justice Aid and the Solomon Islands Development
Context
Transitional justice aid in Solomon Islands should be understood and
analysed within the broader development context: Solomon Islands is cat-
egorised as a least developed country, ranked by the United Nations as 143
of 187 countries in its 2013 Human Development Report.1 27 Aid depen-
dency is high, with aid constituting approximately 50% of Solomon Islands'
gross national income.1 28 Based on current total aid flows, Solomon Islands
is the second greatest recipient of aid per capita of all fragile states, after
Afghanistan.1 2 9 Further, approximately 60% of the entire budget of the Sol-
omon Islands formal law and justice sector is funded by foreign aid do-
nors.1 3 0 This level of aid saturation places a strong impetus on donors to
work to ensure the effectiveness of their assistance; it would also suggest a
need for donors to have a considered exit strategy, supporting Solomon Is-
lands to reduce dependence on aid over the long-term.
Development challenges include, among others, inequality, land access
issues, rapid urbanisation, high youth unemployment and high rates of gen-
der-based and sexual violence.131 Other challenges include weak govern-
ance,1 3 2 vulnerability to the "resource curse,"'33 and limited access to
services in remote areas. These development challenges, viewed through a
post-conflict lens, threaten peace in Solomon Islands, and the full enjoy-
ment of human rights.
127. ** UNDP provided two grants to the Sycamore Tree Project (discussed be-
low). Grants are between 2,500 and 10,000 USD. The figure is an estimate only. As
Australia (under RAMSI) has also provided a small amount of funding this is taken into
consideration in the above estimate. See Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24,
at 27. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: THE RISE OF THE
SoUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD 203 (2013).
128. Net ODA Received Per Capita, WORLD BANK (June 2014), http:/l
data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS.
129. Id.
130. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 5-6. Note that this figure
does not contemplate such restorative transitional justice mechanisms including the Sol-
omon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or any customary justice
institutions.
131. WORLD BANK, supra note 70.
132. See Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 23.
133. Phillip Tagini, What should sustainable mining look like in Solomon Is-
lands?, in LOOKING BEYOND RAMSI 17 (Clive Moore ed., 2013). The term "resource
curse" refers to a situation where resource-rich countries experience limited develop-
ment gains and heightened risk of conflict as a result of the exploitation of resources.
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The next section of the article moves to critically assess the effective-
ness of transitional justice aid to Solomon Islands. This will begin first with
an explanation of how aid is considered effective in dealing with past
abuses, and the norms and standards guiding assessment.
VII. WHAT DOES EFFECTIVE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AID LOOK LIKE?
Effectiveness of transitional justice aid matters for reasons of account-
ability, to maximise benefits and to harness transitional justice's potential,
and to avoid doing harm.1 34 In one sense, the focus on effectiveness could
be understood in a technocratic sense of donors getting value for money.
Rather, the intention is to understand that which counts as success that can-
not be quantified economically.
Effectiveness of transitional justice aid is assessed according to appli-
cable international legal norms and standards, as well as to aid and develop-
ment effectiveness principles. International legal norms-international
human rights law, international criminal law, and international humanita-
rian law-are given particular emphasis. These standards are relatively pre-
cise, agreed, binding (generally), universally applicable, and provide clear
benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness of transitional justice measures
and corresponding aid. These legal standards have been developed and
adopted by myriad countries around the world and bring legitimacy to an
assessment of effectiveness.' 35 The international legal instruments define
the violations to be addressed by transitional justice 36 and contain provi-
sions on how transitional justice should respond, such as provisions on due
process rights. Transitional justice measures should align with international
legal standards, and aid to transitional justice should encourage and support
this, in so far as is possible.
Further, arguably the "most effective approach to transitional justice is
a holistic or coherent one," meaning one that incorporates the full gamut of
transitional justice measures.1 37 It is unlikely that implementing just one of
the transitional justice measures alone, no matter how well, will be adequate
for a country to redress past abuses. As de Greiff explains, the various mea-
sures should be "externally coherent," conceived of and implemented "not
as discrete and independent initiatives but rather as parts of an integrated
134. See Lenzen, supra note 20, at 56.
135. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Soci-
eties: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, supra note 53.
136. See ALEXANDER, supra note 89, at 12-13.
137. Duthie, supra note 1, at 293.
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policy."138 Using the example of reparations, de Greiff convincingly ex-
plains why a holistic approach is preferred:
Truth-telling in the absence of reparations can be seen by victims as
an empty gesture, as cheap talk. The relation holds in the opposite
direction as well: reparations in the absence of truth-telling can be
seen by beneficiaries as the attempt, on the part of the state, to buy
the silence or acquiescence of victims and their families, turning the
benefits into "blood money." The same tight and bidirectional rela-
tionship may be observed between reparations and institutional re-
form, since a democratic reform that is not accompanied by any
attempt to dignify citizens that were victimized can hardly be under-
stood. By the same token, reparative benefits in the absence of re-
forms that diminish the probability of the repetition of violence are
nothing more than payments whose utility, and furthermore legiti-
macy, are questionable. Finally, the same bidirectional relationship
links criminal justice and reparations: from the standpoint of victims,
especially once a possible moment of satisfaction derived from the
punishment of perpetrators has passed, the punishment of a few per-
petrators without any effective effort to positively redress victims
could be easily seen by victims as a form of more or less inconse-
quential revanchism . . . reparations contribute to justice . . . by help-
ing to keep those other measures from fading into irrelevance for
most victims. 139
Transitional justice aid should therefore support a holistic approach to tran-
sitional justice, in so far as is possible. Issues of sovereignty and the priori-
ties of the recipient country are obviously crucial. This goes to the
effectiveness of aid to transitional justice. Yet in Solomon Islands, while
each transitional justice measure has been pursued, by far the greatest em-
phasis has been on criminal justice and institutional reform of the security
sector. The other measures have been given comparably limited attention
and priority by donors and SIG alike. Drawing on de Greiff's words above,
we can see that this is one of the greatest failings of transitional justice aid
to Solomon Islands.
For transitional justice, the quality of aid has implications for the heal-
ing of countries, communities and individuals afflicted by atrocity. Overall,
transitional justice aid will be considered effective to the extent that it helps
countries deal with past abuse. Importantly, aid cannot and will not be the
ultimate determinant of transitional justice's success. Crucially, change, or
138. First Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth,
Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, supra note 54, at ¶ 27.
139. Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARA-
TIONS, supra note 78, at 461.
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transition, in these societies must come primarily from within; transitional
justice must be locally driven and owned, international actors cannot im-
pose it on them.1 40 International actors do have a critical role to play, but it
is largely one of "strengthen[ing] the hand of the [local] reformers," of
working to support those actors and institutions in the pursuit of change,1 4 1
and of bolstering national efforts to achieve justice for past atrocities.1 42
VIII. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID
To TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
A. Criminal Prosecutions
A number of multilateral treaties explicitly require criminal prosecu-
tion of individuals responsible for certain crimes.1 43 For example, the Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment requires all State Parties to criminalize all acts of torture,
with all offences punishable by appropriate penalties. Further, international
law guarantees all people the right to an effective remedy for acts violating
their fundamental human rights. The right to a remedy is broadly under-
stood to encompass state responsibility to punish human rights violations. '44
It invokes the ability of all people to seek and obtain a remedy through
competent national tribunals and other state institutions.1 45 This right is con-
tained in multilateral human rights treaties 46 and other human rights instru-
140. See generally COLLIER, supra note 58.
141. Id. at xi; WORLD BANK, supra note 70, at 145-46.
142. WORLD BANK, supra note 70.
143. Examples of crimes requiring prosecution pursuant to multilateral treaties in-
clude war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, grave beaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions and Protocol I, enforced disappearance and forced labour.
144. FREEMAN, supra note 42.
145. Id.
146. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 13, Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD]; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, 113 [hereinafter CAT]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women, art. (2)(c), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 6, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212 [here-
inafter CERD]. Note, however, that Solomon Islands is not Party to the ICCPR or CAT,
but is Party to the CERD, CRPD and CEDAW.
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ments.1 47 The UN's aforementioned Basic Principles and Guidelines
reaffirm the victim's right to an effective remedy in cases of gross viola-
tions of international human rights law or serious breaches of international
humanitarian law. The right to access to justice is guaranteed also in the
Constitution of Solomon Islands, which articulates the right of every person
in Solomon Islands to the protection of the law, in accordance with fair trial
standards.1 4 8
In the context of criminal justice for the most serious crimes, aims of
prosecutions include: retribution, deterrence, stigmatisation of criminal be-
haviour, rehabilitation of offenders, protection of society, building public
confidence in the rule of law, and promoting the dignity of victims.1 4 9 These
aims suggest why criminal justice may be of interest to development and
transitional justice actors alike. Some of these aims may be understood as
enablers of development and poverty reduction, others as development out-
comes in and of themselves. In particular, the goal of building public confi-
dence in the rule of law is a goal commonly pursued through development
assistance, just as it is also one pursued through transitional justice.
In line with international and domestic law, Solomon Islands has taken
important steps towards ensuring criminal justice and accountability for
some of the most serious human rights abuses committed during the Ten-
sions. This has been critical for building the rule of law in Solomon Islands
and conveying a strong stance against impunity for serious human rights
violations. 150
This has been achieved with significant donor support. In a fieldwork
interview, the Solomon Islands Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP"),
Talasasa, highlighted the contribution of donors to combatting impunity for
conflict-related crimes: "RAMSI support to the Office of the DPP has been
very effective for the Tension cases. Donor support provided the manpower
so that prosecutors could deal with complex matters, which local lawyers
would not normally have the capacity to handle."' 5 ' This quotation high-
lights the value of international input and assistance for achieving accounta-
bility in the aftermath of conflict in a context such as Solomon Islands.
147. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111) A, Art. 8, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 40,
at pts. VII, VIII.
148. CONST. OF SOLOMON ISLANDS, 1978, §§ 3, 10.
149. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-2-T, ¶ 554 (May 15,
2003). This case is referred to in FREEMAN, supra note 42.
150. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 321.
151. Interview with Ronald Bei Talasasa, Director of Public Prosecutions, in Solo-
mon Islands (Oct. 23, 2012).
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One of the legacies of the Tensions was the weakening of state institu-
tions that would be important for dealing with past abuses. As a result of
conflict, legal infrastructure was very basic, with the capacity of the courts
severely limited due to a shortage of both human and economic re-
sources. 152 As then-RAMSI Public Affairs Manager O'Callaghan em-
phasised in a fieldwork interview, this reality created a role for donor
support for judicial reform and strengthening in Solomon Islands.1 53 In this
context, as O'Callaghan explained, donors had a part to play in supporting
restoration of public confidence in the ability and suitability of the courts to
protect human rights and deliver justice.1 54
With the arrival of RAMSI, some 700 militants and police officers
were arrested and processed through the criminal justice system. Clearly,
RAMSI brought with it a strong rule of law agenda, which, from the outset,
required substantial rebuilding of the Solomon Islands criminal justice sys-
tem. 5 5 To this end, RAMSI financed and provided technical assistance in
support of judicial reform and criminal prosecutions. Aid provided under
RAMSI included technical assistance (international advisers), infrastructure
(courts and correctional centres), logistical support and office equipment to
the judicial and correctional systems.1 56 RAMSI's support was successful in
the immediate post-conflict stabilisation phase.157 Specifically, by placing
international advisers in line positions, state law and justice institutions
were quickly brought to a level of functionality, which was crucial for re-
storing trust.' 58 Post-2004, the focus of RAMSI's support for criminal jus-
tice appropriately shifted from stabilisation to building the capacities of
state institutions.1 59 This translated into international advisers having the
capacity to build the skills of Solomon Islanders working in law and justice
sector institutions.1 60
152. Muna B. Ndulo & Roger Duthie, The Role of Judicial Reform in Develop-
ment and Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING
CONNECTIONS, supra note 1, at 250, 251; SoLOMoN ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMM'N, supra note 6, at 144-47.
153. Interview with Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, RAMSI Public Affairs Manager,
in Solomon Islands, (Oct. 25, 2012).
154. Id.; see also Ndulo & Duthie, supra note 152, at 269.
155. Jeffery, supra note 6; Michael Fullilove, The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI
and International State Building (Lowy Inst, for Int'l Policy, Austl.), Mar. 2006, at 4.
156. Interview with Ronald Bei Talasasa, supra note 151; RAMSI's Former Law
and Justice Program, RAMSI, http://www.ramsi.org/works/law-justice (2014).
157. Interview conducted during fieldwork research, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012). Informant asked to be anonymous.
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Overall, this support for institutional capacity development has been
quite ineffective-a view that has been conveyed in academic literaturel6'
and program evaluation,1 62 as well as in some fieldwork interviews. For
example, Nori, a Solomon Islands lawyer and legal consultant, highlighted
in an interview that "RAMSI's efforts resulted in very minimal lasting en-
hanced capacity" in Solomon Islands law and justice institutions.1 6 3 Like-
wise, the Solomon Islands DPP explained that: "The capacity of the Office
of the DPP has not risen significantly since RAMSI began its support, par-
ticularly in terms of capacity to prosecute serious crimes of the kind com-
mitted during the period of the Tensions."M This criticism of donor
approaches to institutional capacity development is returned to below in
part VIII(D).
Owing to the extensive development assistance afforded, several
dozen'16 so-called Tension Trials have now been completed,1 66 with an esti-
mated ten to twenty convictions secured.1 67 Important inroads have been
made in combatting impunity. All trials have been conducted within the
Solomon Islands judicial system, prosecuted under the domestic criminal
161. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6; Anna Powles, Mission Creep:
Statebuilding from Honiara to Dili, 2 SEC. CHALLENGES, no. 2, July 2006, at 9, 10.
162. See Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24.
163. Interview with Andrew Nori, Legal Consultant and former Legal Adviser to
the Malaita Eagle Force, in Solomon Islands, (Oct. 24, 2012).
164. Interview with Ronald Bei Talasasa, supra note 151.
165. By the end of 2007, nineteen Tension Trials had been completed, which at
that time represented approximately half of all anticipated trials. One year later, thirty-
one Tension Trials had been completed. RAMSI, Performance Report 2007/2008, Key
Highlights (Jul. 2008). An evaluation of Australia's law and justice assistance to Solo-
mon Islands found that forty-five Tension Trials had been completed by 2012. Note,
however, that there is no certainty as to the precise number of Tension Trials that have
been conducted to date. This is due to the absence of any clear criteria guiding the
classification of a case as a Tension Trial. Further, incomplete court records add to this
uncertainty. According to the Solomon Islands TRC, RAMSI possesses accurate
records of the Tension Trials, though did not release those records to the TRC. SOLO-
MON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 323.
166. ICTJ, supra note 48.
167. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 323.
Further, according to the Solomon Islands TRC,
[a]s of I August 2011 there were 12 outstanding tension trials. From these 12 trials
there were 15 charges and 29 defendants (who are often the same person). In three
of these the accused was still at large; in three, files were missing; in six, matters




code.1 68 The majority of cases have related to charges of murder or abduc-
tion, committed during the Tensions.1 6 9 There have been no charges relating
to any international crimes, despite evidence of their having been commit-
ted during the Tensions. This is because relevant international laws have
not been incorporated into the domestic law of Solomon Islands, namely
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.1 70
Instead, for example, killings have been tried as murders rather than as
war crimes. As is suggested in the TRC report:
[T]his is not satisfactory because the offence under domestic law
does not carry the same degree of opprobrium or condemnation as
would a crime under international law. Similarly, the sanctions under
domestic law could conceivably be lighter as well, and a perpetrator
might have available to him/her avenues such as remission of
sentences and early release options not available in international
law.' 7 '
This quotation draws into focus difficulties associated with applying inter-
national law in Solomon Islands. It highlights also the value of incorporat-
ing international law into domestic jurisdictions. Foreign aid donors,
therefore, might consider supporting strengthening of international law by
providing legislative assistance for domestic implementation of interna-
tional law. Of course, while a donor may encourage a country to ratify or to
implement international legal instruments, the decision will ultimately be
made by the country itself. A sound legal framework is a prerequisite for
successful prosecutions of international crimes in Solomon Islands, as it is
in all countries.1 72
Certainly, donors could not have supported retrospective application of
the law to crimes committed during the Tensions. To do so would have
been in violation of the principle of legality. 7 3 This is a fundamental princi-
168. See Penal Code, LAWS OF SOLOMON ISLANDS ch. 26, (1963).
169. See SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at
323.
170. Rome Statute of the Int'l Criminal Court, art. 17(l)(a), July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 100. Note that the Solomon Islands Government signed the Rome Statute on
December 3, 1998, but has not ratified it nor incorporated its provisions into domestic
legislation.
171. See SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at
363.
172. ICTJ, THE ROME STATUTE REVIEW CONFERENCE: THEMATIC CASE STUDY,
JUNE 2010, KAMPALA: STOCKTAKING COMPLEMENTARITY 3 (2010).
173. See, e.g., CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 22-30 (Antonio Cas-
sesse et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
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pie of the rule of law, requiring all laws to be prospective; a person cannot
be bound by a law that did not exist when the alleged transgression oc-
curred.17 4 Rather, given the gaps in legal protection, donors might have con-
sidered supporting the incorporation of international law into Solomon
Islands domestic law in the aftermath of the Tensions. This would enable
greater legal protections in Solomon Islands in the future. Such legislative
reform would establish Solomon Islands as a regional leader and model to
the Pacific for the domestic incorporation of international law.
One of the key strengths of donor support for criminal prosecutions in
Solomon Islands is that trials have been conducted domestically in Solomon
Islands. National-level criminal prosecutions, as distinct from international
or hybrid justice, were encouraged and facilitated by foreign aid donors,
through RAMSI. 7 5 While domestic prosecutions are not always possible
after atrocity, such as where there is not strong enough capacity, political
will, or judicial independence, there can be some clear advantages. In Solo-
mon Islands, unlike the police and correctional services, the courts main-
tained their independence from militant influence during the Tensions.1 76
This meant that prosecutions could occur domestically and could be insti-
gated quickly at the end of the conflict. As O'Callaghan highlighted, trials
could also be initiated quickly due to RAMSI's success in bringing the se-
curity situation under control quickly, and so could capitalise on the ab-
sence of violence.17 7 Further, one donor representative emphasised that
because the judiciary remained independent during the conflict, though its
capacity weakened, there could also be public confidence in the judiciary,
that decisions would be free of bias. 7 8 Therefore, donor support for national
prosecutions was relevant and well-suited to context.
An obvious benefit of domestic prosecutions for international crimes
and other serious rights violations is that trials occur closer to where the
crimes were committed. Local people affected by the conflict are more
likely to be cognisant of (and perhaps attend) the trials and feel that justice
is being served. Prosecutions are understood to have more potential for im-
pact when they are held domestically, within the society where the crimes
174. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
210, 214 (1977).
175. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands, (Oct.
2012).
176. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 314.
177. Interview with Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, Public Affairs Manager, RAMSI,
in Solomon Islands (Oct. 25, 2012).




occurred.' 79 Further, independent and impartial prosecutions for serious
crimes before domestic courts can help build public confidence in the rule
of law. 80 As Freeman explains, human rights trials can play both a retribu-
tive role and an "expressivist one," that is, "to communicate the value of
law and justice as social goods."' 8 ' Prosecutions in domestic tribunals, as
Ndulo and Duthie suggest,
[C]an have an enduring effect on the local justice systems and in
norm articulation. Long-term improvement of the justice system
helps the development of a culture of justice and accountability and
ensures that norms established during the prosecution of past human
rights violations will not vanish when the . . . trial is over. The judi-
cial system can be strengthened and legitimized for its long-term role
of protecting the constitution, ensuring the rule of law, and facilitat-
ing development.1 82
This quotation brings into focus the value of domestic prosecutions in post-
conflict contexts such as Solomon Islands-donors have been instrumental
in facilitating this. Further, the substantial aid dollars and resources directed
in support of national-level prosecutions can have a larger flow-on effect
for the country, potentially resulting in a stronger judicial system. This is a
benefit that does not so easily flow from international justice. This is a
relevant consideration given international justice's significant cost. Further,
domestic criminal prosecutions can demonstrate the authority of the state,
weakened in the context of armed conflict. In this way aid can help to
strengthen state authority in transitional societies, key to making societies
more resilient to violence.8 3
Yet one of the most significant shortcomings of the Tension Trials has
been the complete absence of criminal prosecutions for sexual violence.'
This is despite the high incidence of sexual violence perpetrated during the
conflict.'" Complaints of rape, sexual slavery, forced nudity, sexual harass-
ment, violence against sexual organs, and being forced to witness behaviour
of a sexual nature have been documented.1 86 Accounts of sexual violence
179. See The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, supra note 53.
180. FREEMAN, supra note 42, at 15.
181. Id. at 22.
182. Ndulo & Duthie, supra note 152, at 251-52.
183. Id.
184. See SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at
471.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note
6, at 351; Fangalasuu et al., supra note 102, at 19-21.
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recorded by the TRC are harrowing; victims conveyed experiences of hav-
ing been threatened by armed militants wielding guns, sometimes under the
influence of drugs and alcohol.' 8 7 Children were also found to have suffered
sexual violence. Further, there is evidence that some acts of sexual violence
were committed for the very reason of the victim's ethnic identity.188 It is a
significant injustice that such grave violations have gone unpunished.
Despite the gravity of the violations, sexual violence has not been the
focus of criminal justice efforts in Solomon Islands-a justice deficit re-
mains. This is true despite the fact that Solomon Islands domestic law
criminalises sexual violence such that criminal prosecutions were possible
under existing laws.1 89 It should be noted, though, that failure to prosecute
sexual and gender-based violence in Solomon Islands is also a general sys-
temic problem, with prosecutions low prior to and during the conflict.
Further, additional to the above-mentioned international law provi-
sions requiring justice for atrocities, including sexual violence, various UN
Security Council resolutions reject impunity for sexual violence. UN Secur-
ity Council Resolution 1325 calls on all parties to conflict to take special
measures to protect women and girls from sexual violence in situations of
armed conflict. It emphasises the responsibility of all States to put an end to
impunity and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes including those
relating to sexual violence.1 90 Resolution 1325 is reinforced by six subse-
quent UN Security Council resolutions relating to the Women Peace and
Security agenda.191 As UN Security Council resolutions are legally binding
on States under international law,1 9 2 there is a clear legal imperative requir-
ing prosecution of sexual violence committed during the Tensions. Further,
internationally there is a renewed commitment to combating impunity for
sexual violence:1 93 ICC Prosecutor Bensouda has articulated a commitment
187. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 471.
188. Id.
189. Penal Code, LAWS OF SOLOMON ISLANDS ch. 26, pt. XVI (1963). Note, how-
ever, that the current definition of rape in the Penal Code does not consider men as
victims of rape. This definition is currently under review by the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Solomon Islands.
190. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 117.
191. See S.C. Res. 2122, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2122 (Oct. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2106,
U.N. Doc S/RES/2106 (June 24, 2013); S.C. Res. 1960, U.N. Doc S/RES/I 1960 (Dec.
16, 2010); S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C. Res. 1888, U.N.
Doc S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc S/RES/1820 (June 19,
2008).
192. U.N. Charter art. 25.
193. See also Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, Gov.UK, http://
www.gov.uk/govemment/topical-events/sexual-violence-in-conflict (last visited Sept.
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to prosecuting sexual and gender-based crimes,1 94 and her office has devel-
oped a policy paper on this issue. 195
A variety of factors may have prevented prosecutions of sexual vio-
lence, contributing to this gendered injustice. For example, the TRC identi-
fied "cultural codes" and the "stigma and shame surrounding sexual
violence" as significant obstacles preventing its being discussed.1 96 Strong
cultural taboos limit the ability of many women to divulge experiences of
sexual violence such that women may risk further violence by speaking
out.1 9 7 Additionally, a lack of legal literacy among victims and knowledge
of their rights has also hindered access to justice for victims of sexual vio-
lence.1 98 Geographic remoteness and the limited functioning of the judicial
system during the Tensions also contributed.1 99 There is purportedly also a
backlog of cases within the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. 200
Based on the findings of fieldwork interviews and aid program docu-
mentation review, there is no evidence to suggest that this was a priority for
SIG or for donors. Program documents reviewed did not contain any ex-
press priority placed on prosecuting sexual violence committed during the
Tensions. Likewise, donor representatives interviewed did not emphasise
this as a priority or specific objective of their assistance. This is a missed
opportunity, particularly where substantial aid resources were directed to
criminal prosecutions for conflict-related crimes. It reflects a disjuncture
between international commitments and the reality of post-conflict settings.
This impunity for sexual violence has arguably contributed to the con-
tinuing high incidence of gender-based violence, including sexual violence,
in Solomon Islands into the present. The Tensions are said to have en-
trenched gender-based violence in Solomon Islands society, including wide-
27, 2014). Held in London in June 2014, this was the largest meeting on the subject to
date, with 1,700 delegates and 129 country delegations including 79 Ministers.
194. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect, Int'l Criminal Court, Gender Justice and
the ICC: Progress and Reflections, Statement Before International Conference: 10 years
review of the ICC. Justice for All? The International Criminal Court (Feb. 14, 2012).
195. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY PAPER
ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES (June 2014).
196. SOLoMoN ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 498.
197. Vella, supra note 25, at 8.
198. SoLOMoN ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 471.
199. Id.
200. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 55. Note that this backlog
was alleged to exist by certain Participating Police Force and AusAID personnel in
interviews conducted by Cox, Duituturaga and Scheye, however RSIPF deny this. Inter-
view with Ronald Bei Talasasa, supra note 151.
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spread rape. 201 In fact, in 2012 the World Bank identified Solomon Islands
as having the highest rate of sexual violence in the world.202 It might be
argued that impunity for gross acts of sexual violence has opened the door
to further violence. Future aid to the law and justice sector, therefore,
should place greater emphasis on prosecuting sexual violence and other vio-
lence against women and girls. 20 3 This is one key way in which donors
failed to leverage their transitional justice aid in support of broader devel-
opment outcomes, namely ending violence against women and improving
access to justice for survivors.
One other weakness of the international community's support for the
Tension Trials was that there were some criticisms over issues of due pro-
cess. Particularly in RAMSI's early stages, questions were raised concern-
ing violations of suspects' rights in the collection of evidence during arrests
by the Participating Police Force (PPF). As the TRC reported, "[t]he stan-
dard of evidence collection [was] a major problem for the Prosecution . . . it
took a while for the PPF and police to be able to investigate in a way that
maintained the rights of individuals." While unfair evidentiary issues were
resolved fairly during the trial and appeals process, 204 it was important for
the process to be conducted fairly, at all stages, for the process to be seen as
legitimate. 205
B. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
International law protects the right of victims and survivors to know
about the circumstances of gross violations of their human rights, including
who was responsible for the violations. 206 This right to truth is contained in
a number of international human rights instruments including the Interna-
201. Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission a Historic Opportu-
nity, AMNESTY INT'L AUSTL., http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/22663; see
also SECRETARIAT OF THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY MINISTRY OF WOMEN, YOUTH AND
CHILDREN'S AFFAIRS, SOLOMON ISLANDS FAMILY HEALTH AND SAFETY STUDY: A
STUDY ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN 2-4 (2009).
202. Solomon Islands Worst Country for Sexual Violence Against Women - World
Bank, ABC RADIO AUSTRALIA, Mar. 26, 2012, http://radioaustralia.net.au/international/
radio/onairhighlights/solomon-islands-worst-country-for-sexual-violence-against-wo-
men-world-bank.
203. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 53-56.
204. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 319.
205. Interview with Andrew Nori, supra note 163.
206. See Vehisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4 (July 29, 1988) (articulating, in the first judicial ruling to do so, the existence of
the right to the truth); see also Ellacuria v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 136/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev [ 5 (1999); Al-
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tional Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance 207 and the Basic Principles and Guidelines. 208 The Human Rights
Council has located the right to truth in the context of contributing to end-
ing impunity.209 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights,210 treaty bodies, 2 11 and special procedures of the Human
Rights Council 212 have similarly conceptualised the right to truth.2 13 The
right to truth may be fulfilled in various ways, including freedom of infor-
mation legislation, declassification of archives, investigations into the miss-
ing and disappeared, and the establishment of non-judicial commissions of
inquiry, and truth commissions. 2 14
meida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at
138, ¶ 14 (1990).
207. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 24, Dec. 20, 2006, 2715 U.N.T.S. 12.
208. Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶¶ 22, 24.
209. Human Rights Council Res. 12/11, Human Rights and Transitional Justice, ¶
6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/11 (Oct. 12, 2009); Human Rights Council Res. 9/11,
Right to the Truth, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/l1 (Sept. 18, 2008).
210. See Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Study on
the Right to the Truth, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8, 2006); Rep. of the Office of
the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Right to the Truth, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/
5/7 (June 7, 2007).
211. See, e.g., U.N. Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee Against Torture, ¶ 27, CAT/C/COL/CO/4 (May 4, 2010).
212. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Report of the Special Rap-
porteur, 1 23-26, 32-34, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/H-RC/22/52 (Apr.
17, 2013) (by Ben Emmerson); Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-
ances, Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, ¶ 39,
U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/48 (Jan. 26, 2011); Special Rap-
porteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expres-
sion, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, ¶ 34, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. Al
HRC/14/23 (Apr. 20, 2010) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Rep. of the Special Rap-
porteur, ¶ 82, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3/Add.3 (Oct. 1, 2007)
(by Manfred Nowak).
213. In setting out the international legal basis for the right to truth, I have drawn
on the analysis of Pablo de Greiff. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth,
Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recur-
rence, Pablo de Greiff, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc A/HRC/24/42 (Aug. 28,
2013). I have also drawn on HAYNER, supra note 80, at 23-24.
214. Truth and Memory, ICTJ, http://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-
issues/truth-and-memory (June 2014).
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The value of truth seeking rests in its contribution to the "creation of a
historical record" and, in so doing, preventing manipulation and the deliber-
ate rewriting of history and a denial of atrocities by perpetrators. 2 15 Truth
seeking is also esteemed for its perceived ability to "help victims find clo-
sure by learning more about the events they suffered, such as the fate of
disappeared individuals, or why certain people were targeted for abuse." 2 16
Hayner also points to the value of truth seeking for confronting the legacy
of past horrors in order to lay a solid foundation on which to build a new
society.217 Hayner warns against "bury[ing] . . . sins, [as] they will re-
emerge later." 218 And so, logically, the question arises: to what extent, if at
all, has truth-seeking in Solomon Islands contributed to achieving the
above-mentioned objectives; or has it been merely a case of burial of sins?
The task of truth seeking in Solomon Islands has been broached
through the TRC. Analysis of donor support for the TRC is instructive
given the increasing uptake of truth commissions throughout the world, in-
cluding in developing countries where aid donors operate. As of 2014, some
forty official truth commissions, the precise number dependent upon the
definition to which one subscribes, have been set up for truth-seeking and
peacebuilding purposes. 2 19 Almost all truth commissions have been imple-
mented in developing countries, most with some support of the international
community. 220
The greatest shortcoming of the Solomon Islands TRC process has
been the failure of the SIG to formally release the TRC's final report and
implement its recommendations. This inaction triggered the report's editor,
Reverend Dr. Terry Brown, to leak the report in April 2013. This followed
significant stalling by the SIG, which failed to formally release the report,
despite having a statutory obligation to do so and receiving it from the TRC
commissioners fourteen months prior.22 1 At the time of writing, the SIG still
had not released the report. Unfortunately, this has not prompted any action
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. HAYNER, supra note 80, at 23.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.; The DAC List of ODA Recipients, OECD (Jan. 2012), http://www.oecd
.org/dac/stats/49483614.pdf. Of the approximately forty countries to have implemented
a truth commission, Canada, Germany, South Korea and the United States are the only
developed countries to have done so.
221. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008 (No. 5 of 2008), § 17(1)
(Solomon Islands) (providing that the "Prime Minister on receiving the report of the




on the part of the SIG. Instead, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Lilo has
"defied repeated calls for the report's release," 22 2 on the basis of the report's
"sensitivity" and the need to "handle the issues in a responsible way." 22 3
There is allegedly also a working group in the Prime Minister's Office in
Solomon Islands, developing a revised, "less sensitive" version of the final
report. 22 4 This runs contrary to goals of truth-seeking in Solomon Islands.
To prompt release of the TRC report and implementation of its recom-
mendations, questions have arisen as to whether donors should employ a
strategy of aid conditionality. 22 5 This would involve donors threatening to
cut off or reduce development assistance to Solomon Islands, and executing
that threat, so as to compel human rights compliance.226 The idea is that
donors could try to wield their development assistance to put pressure on
SIG to release the TRC report, implement its recommendations, and in so
doing, promote human rights. However, political conditionality is in no way
recommended as a viable, effective option for transitional justice aid in Sol-
omon Islands. Aid conditionality is "beset with problems," most notably
that it has a "track record of not working, of not producing the desired
results, and even, possibly, of creating dynamics that undermine the desired
results." 227 It is notable that no donor representatives interviewed during
fieldwork indicated any intention to do so. In Solomon Islands, at least, it
seems that donors do not view aid conditionality as a tool for enhancing the
effectiveness of a truth commission. No donor representative interviewed
mentioned any aid conditionality strategy or preference for this approach.
Delays in releasing the report effectively function to deny justice and
dignity to victims, particularly those people who engaged genuinely in the
TRC process, hoping to see change. As such, it remains important that the
TRC report is released and genuine efforts made to implement its recom-
mendations-donors arguably have a role in this. In particular, a representa-
tive of the Solomon Islands TRC interviewed during fieldwork suggested
that donors that funded the TRC process might be said to have a moral
responsibility to Solomon Islanders to do all possible to ensure the success
222. Vella, supra note 25.
223. Ben Rakai, Six Months More for TRC Report, Says PM, SOLOMON STAR,
Mar. 28, 2013, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2013/March/03-29-14.htm
224. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
225. Discussion at Regulatory Institutions Network Workshop on Current Issues
in Transitional Justice at Australian National University (Oct. 28, 2013).
226. See UvIN, supra note 62, at 77.
227. Id.
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of their aid. 22 8 Some, though not all, donors that supported the TRC have
engaged in dialogue with the SIG, emphasising the importance of the TRC
report and its recommendations. 229 One representative of a donor agency
interviewed divulged that they had raised the issue in bilateral meetings
with SIG, stressing its value as a "genuine tool for reconciliation." 230 The
same donor representative has purportedly also emphasised to SIG that "by
engaging in the TRC process, the SIG had committed itself." 231 Now that
the TRC had been implemented and the report created, "to not release the
report nor implement its recommendations would be perhaps more damag-
ing than to have not had a TRC at all." 23 2 Building the political will of
partner governments and keeping transitional justice on the agenda would
seem an important and valid role for donors.
The Solomon Islands TRC made a number of recommendations of di-
rect relevance for the country's development. The TRC recommendations
target underlying causes of the Tensions, including poverty, inequality and
exclusion. In short, a number of the TRC recommendations confront devel-
opment issues: land, governance, health, education, livelihoods and gender
equality 233-all issues of concern for foreign aid donors. It is here that we
see very clearly the links between transitional justice and development.
Some donor representatives operating in Solomon Islands conveyed in
fieldwork interviews willingness to support implementation of the report's
recommendations if requested by SIG. 2 34 Doing so would leverage transi-
tional justice aid to achieve broader development and poverty reduction
gains.
C. Reparation
To date, there has been no comprehensive, national program for repa-
ration in Solomon Islands, despite the right of victims of gross human rights
228. Interview with a representative of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, in Solomon Islands (Oct. 2012).
229. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
230. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
231. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
232. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
233. See SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6.
234. Interviews with representatives of several bilateral and multilateral donor
agencies, in Solomon Islands (Oct. 2012).
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violations to receive reparation for serious harm suffered, 235 which may take
the form of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guar-
antees of non-repetition. 236 This right exists in international law 237 and in
the domestic law of Solomon Islands. 238 In addition to the legal bases for
reparation, there are important moral and socio-political dimensions that
warrant consideration. 239 Lykes and Mersky highlight the potential for repa-
rations to contribute to social reconstruction and reconciliation, seeking to
"heal individual and social wounds." 24 0 Rombouts et al. point to the poten-
tial for reparation to promote peaceful coexistence and to prevent acts of
revenge. 24 1
Similarly, de Greiff highlights the potential for reparations to contrib-
ute to goals of recognition, civic trust and social solidarity. 24 2 Politically,
and particularly in transition contexts, additional to their relationship to jus-
tice, reparations infer a political commitment to repair harm suffered and
constitute public recognition of suffering. 243 For victims, reparations may
occupy a "special place" in a transition from conflict: "[f]or some victims
reparations are the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state to
remedy the harms they have suffered." 2 44 Further, victims may continue to
suffer "stigma, social exclusion and re-victimisation" as a consequence of
235. See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (2d ed. 2005); Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 57; Dinah Shelton, The
United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and Contents, in
OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS VII, 11 (Koen de Feyter et al. eds., 2005).
236. Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 40.
237. See CAT, supra note 146; CEDAW, supra note 146; ICCPR, supra note 146,
arts. 2(3), 9(5), 14(6); CERD, supra note 146; Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra
note 40; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 147, art. 8; see also
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obliga-
tion on States Parties to the Covenant, T 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13
(2004). Note, however, that Solomon Islands is not Party to the ICCPR or CAT; Solo-
mon Islands is Party to CERD and CEDAW.
238. CONST. OF SOLOMON ISLANDS, 1978, ch. 3.
239. Heidy Rombouts et al., The Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross and
Systematic Violations of Human Rights, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VIC-
TIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, supra note 235, at 345,
348.
240. M. Brinton Lykes & Marcie Mersky, Reparations and Mental Health, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 78, at 590.
241. Rombouts et al., supra note 239, at 354.
242. First Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth,
Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, supra note 54, at ¶ 27.
243. See Rombouts et al., supra note 239, at 354.
244. Pablo de Greiff in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 78, at 2.
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their exclusion from other transitional justice processes. 24 5 Undoubtedly, so-
cial-exclusion hinders the full enjoyment of development gains by all.
These are all reasons why the aid community should turn their attention to
reparation.
Drawing on the above analysis, one can appreciate the potential for
reparations to improve "lives and societies"-a shared goal of transitional
justice and development. 246 While there has been no comprehensive repara-
tions program, there has been an entirely unsuccessful government-led
monetary compensation scheme. The scheme was set up in 2001 pursuant
to the Townsville Peace Agreement 247 funded by the Government of Tai-
wan. 248 Political imperatives seem to have driven Taiwan's aid, with assis-
tance provided ostensibly "in return for Solomon Islands' diplomatic
recognition of it."249
A major limitation of the scheme was that the SIG had no policy or
guidelines to regulate its implementation. 25 0 It was never specified which
human rights violations would be compensated under the scheme. This
proved problematic as it effectively "opened the door for anyone to make a
claim." 2 5 1 The Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, which
implemented the scheme, was "flooded" with claims for compensation. 25 2
With no policy or guidelines informing implementation of the scheme and
no defined categories of human rights violations, there was no consistency
or equity in the award of compensation; "the process was ad hoc and sub-
ject to the whims of the moment." 253 Further, there was no process in place
for confirming the veracity of claims which gave rise to corruption and
misappropriation of funds earmarked for compensation. 2 54
Records indicate that compensation "payments [were made] to politi-
cians, militants, business people and those with connections to the Govern-
ment." 2 55 Some militants obtained funds by extortion. 256 Those "without
245. CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT To REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
VICTIMs OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2012).
246. Lenzen, supra note 20.
247. Townsville Peace Agreement, supra note 112, pts. 2(1)(b), 2(2), 3(1).
248. SOLoMoN ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 657.
249. AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE, OUR FAILING NEIGHBOUR: Aus-
TRALIA AND THE FUTURE OF SOLOMON ISLANDS 24 (2003).
250. See SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6.
251. Id. at 274.
252. Id. at 294.
253. Id. at 299.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 260.
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influence or means were overlooked" such that a great number of victims
did not receive compensation. 25 7 An investigation into the scheme by the
Auditor General found that "millions of dollars were spent on highly sus-
pect and dubious claims." 25 8 Compensation is considered a driver of conflict
in Solomon Islands, labelled as a "dynamic of disorder," fuelling criminal-
ity, and driving "frenzied and sometimes violent competition between
claimants." 2 59 This is an example of how aid resources can be misused and
detrimental in contexts of conflict.
Taiwan's funding of the compensation scheme is a lesson in ineffec-
tive development practice. Support was ill-suited to the context; state insti-
tutions were hardly functioning and so did not have the capacity to
administer a complex compensation scheme. 260 For this form of aid to have
succeeded, at the very least, it would have needed to be accompanied by
ongoing, rigorous efforts to strengthen relevant institutions charged with its
implementation-but this did not occur. The form of assistance was partic-
ularly inappropriate considering the situation of "lawlessness," "criminal-
ity" and "anarchy." 261 Failure to monitor the impact of funding and make
corresponding adjustments, or disregard of monitoring results, underscores
the shortcomings of Taiwan's support. It is indicative of a donor for whom
the internal affairs, state of human rights and aid effectiveness were of little
concern.
This experience invokes the thesis put forward by Anderson in her
seminal text Do No Harm.2 62 Anderson argues that the way that donors
provide aid in conflict-affected contexts can either support, or fuel, peace or
conflict. 26 3 As Anderson explains: "[w]hen international assistance is given
in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes part of that context and thus
also of the conflict." 264 Taiwan's assistance is an unfortunate example of
aid's potential for harm. Certainly also, where a donor funds compensation
this raises questions as to the appropriate role for external actors in financ-
ing reparation. Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky describe the "essential 'charac-
ter' of reparations" as being "an act done as, and that individuals in the
257. Id. at 299.
258. Id. at 278 (citing AUDITOR GENERAL FOR THE SOLOMON ISLANDS, REPORT OF
THE AUDITOR GENERAL INTO THE EXPORT IMPORT [EXIM] BANK LOAN (Nov. 2004)).
259. FRAENKEL, supra note 102.
260. SOLOMON ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 299.
261. Id. at 155, 299.
262. MARY B. ANDERSON, Do No HARM: How AID CAN SUPPORT PEACE-OR
WAR I (1999).
263. Id. at 2-3.
264. Id. at 145.
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community recognize as, atonement for past harms." 265 Where donors as-
sume the total funding burden, as Taiwan did, the atoning quality is largely
removed.
Beyond the above-described compensation scheme, there have been
recent calls for reparation. The TRC, in its final report, recommended estab-
lishing a reparations program for conflict victims, to include monetary com-
pensation and in-kind measures including housing, employment, health, and
education measures. 266 It is here that one sees a dovetailing in the concerns
of transitional justice and development. The TRC also recommends repara-
tion for victims of sexual and gender-based violence. 267 This is particularly
compelling noting the absence of any remedy for women who suffered sex-
ual violence during the conflict, and the need for the state to demonstrate
condemnation of this.
As it relates to a role for donors, they might consider contributing
funds. It might be argued that for "humanitarian reasons," the international
community should contribute to financing reparations where developing
countries are unable to bear the full cost.2 68 This is likely the situation of
Solomon Islands, particularly when combined with the cost of implement-
ing all (or most) other TRC recommendations. 2 69
Any decision by donors to support reparations should depend on lead-
ership and demonstrated political commitment of the SIG. Unfortunately,
no such commitment has been demonstrated to date; the SIG continues to
withhold the final TRC report. An appropriate entry point for donors, there-
fore, may be in building the political will of SIG through human rights-
informed policy dialogue, focused on the value of reparations for the coun-
try. Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky similarly suggest an important role for do-
nors in building consideration of reparations into discussions around
government budgets in post-conflict contexts. 270 In this way, donors might
use policy dialogue as a tool to build political will in support of the
mobilisation of resources towards financing reparations.
From there, taking an optimistic view: in a scenario where political
commitment to reparation is demonstrated, how might donors engage? One
donor interviewed during fieldwork in Solomon Islands expressed openness
265. Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 57, at 173.
266. SoLoMoN ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 728,
730; see also Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008 § 16 (setting out the
authority of the TRC to make recommendations).
267. SoLoMoN ISLANDS TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 6, at 728.
268. Segovia, supra note 78, at 658-59.
269. Interview with a representative of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, in Solomon Islands (Aug. 2013).
270. Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 57, at 204-05.
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to supporting reparations if requested to do so by the SIG.2 7 1 They high-
lighted that support would be provided if it was felt that the process would
genuinely "contribute to reconciliation." 272 They also emphasised that any
support would take the form of technical assistance and support for imple-
menting in-kind reparations, rather than financing monetary compensation
payments. 27 3 This would seem a more effective approach given the past
experience of Taiwan's funding of compensation. Certainly considerable
technical assistance will be necessary: reparations programs, in addition to
requiring considerable amounts of public resources, are complex to design
and implement.274 As Segovia explains, reparations programs require "the
existence of qualified technical resources, public and private institutional
resources, and reliable statistical data, all of which is not always available
in transitional societies." 275
Finally, where donors are willing to provide support for reparations-
in whatever form-it is recommended that they be made contingent upon a
budgetary contribution from the SIG. This should be a meaningful (if not
the principal) contribution, sufficient to demonstrate ownership of and po-
litical commitment to reparations. This is central to the symbolic function
of reparation. 2 76 In this way, the use of internal resources itself represents an
act of reparation. 277 This recommended funding model is pragmatic, ac-
counting for the substantial cost of reparations without removing their
"aton[ing] quality." 278
D. Institutional Reform
Institutional reform of the security and justice sectors of Solomon Is-
lands was a key component of RAMSI's development assistance. In the
context of transitional justice, institutional reform is about reforming State
structures and institutions that "facilitated or promoted" atrocities. 279 The
purpose is to guarantee against recurrence of atrocity. 2 80 It is required under
271. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
272. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
273. Interview with a representative of a donor agency, in Solomon Islands (Oct.
2012).
274. Segovia, supra note 78, at 670.
275. Id. at 652.
276. Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 57.
277. Segovia, supra note 78, at 652.
278. Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 57, at 173.
279. OHCHR, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 44.
280. Id.
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international law: international human rights law places an obligation on
States to prevent the reoccurrence, or repetition, of atrocities in the fu-
ture. 281 Institutional reform has involved vetting of police and corrections
officers who participated in hostilities.28 2 It has also involved capacity de-
velopment activities across the justice and security sectors, primarily train-
ing and mentoring. 283 A raft of new legislation has been adopted, most
commendably a new Correctional Services Act, 284 which reflects interna-
tional human rights standards governing the treatment of detainees. 285 The
Act has been pivotal in re-establishing the legitimacy of the Correctional
Services of Solomon Islands.28 6 The main strength of donor support for in-
stitutional reform in Solomon Islands is that it has been conceived of as a
long-term process, recognising that after-conflict state institutions will gen-
erally take at least a generation to rebuild and reform.287 The short, three-
year project cycle typical of many aid activities conflicts with this need for
a sustained approach to reform.
Despite some important achievements, there are serious concerns sur-
rounding the sustainability of the institutional reform efforts supported by
RAMSI. Solomon Islands law and justice institutions (police, corrections
and the judicial sector) are financially dependent on Australian aid: "virtu-
281. Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 40, 1 23; OHCHR, TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 44. While the justice sector in Solomon Islands did not
facilitate or promote human rights abuses during the Tensions, remaining independent
of militant influence, this part contemplates justice sector reform together with police
and corrections reform. (Note that police and corrections were involved in the hostilities
and corrupted by conflict). This is because the criticisms of the aid directed to justice
sector reform in Solomon Islands similarly apply to aid for police and corrections re-
form, so all institutional reform efforts and the corresponding aid should be considered
together. Analysis of justice sector reform could equally be located above in the section
on Tension Trials, part VIII(A).
282. ICTJ, supra note 48. A program for the demobilisation of "Special Consta-
bles" from the RSIPF was employed to vet former-militants from the police force. The
Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme-a kind of vetting scheme for the RSIPF-targets
police officers who played a role in the Tensions. Under the Scheme, police may nomi-
nate themselves or someone else involved in the conflict. Those found to have played a
role are asked to leave the police force, but will receive their full wage until the retire-
ment age of 55.
283. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 80.
284. Correctional Services Act 2007 (No. 8 of 2007) (Solomon Islands).
285. OHCHR Regional Office for the Pacific, A Region-Wide Assessment of
Laws on the Prevention of Torture and Other Ill Treatment of Detainees (2009), http://
pacific.ohchr.org/docs/Tortureill treatmentStudy.pdf.
286. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 63.
287. See WORLD BANK, supra note 70.
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ally all of RAMSI's law and justice expenditures-and thus Solomon Is-
lands law and justice development programs-are paid for by Australia." 288
RAMSI provides approximately two-thirds of the cost of policing in Solo-
mon Islands, 289 and Australian aid funds finance over sixty per cent of all
law and justice expenditure. 290 Aid dependency in the sector is high. An
evaluation of Australia's law and justice aid to Solomon Islands found that
the "current configuration of the country's law and justice institutions and
agencies is unsustainable." 29 1 This is problematic as once RAMSI with-
draws, it is questionable whether SIG has the capacity and will to maintain
the institutions that RAMSI has helped to build. 29 2 Any development initia-
tive needs to provide a model that is fit for purpose.
Further, in order to build citizen confidence in state institutions, it is
important that results are attributed to these institutions, not to donors. 293
Yet, this has been inadequate in Solomon Islands; RAMSI understandably
invested in its own public relations to highlight its work. One unfortunate
effect of this was that RAMSI's Participating Police Force (made up of
internationals) received more attention than did the Solomon Islands police.
This meant that public confidence was likely to be greater in the RAMSI
Participating Police Force where what was important was to rebuild public
confidence in the institutions of the Solomon Islands state.294 This is an
example of ineffective development practice in the transitional justice
sphere in Solomon Islands; an unintended, detrimental impact of transi-
tional justice aid.
On a different note, in addition to reforming law and justice sector
institutions, more might have been done to address "root causes of con-
flict . .. and violations of economic, social and cultural rights." 295 Indeed,
two World Bank representatives interviewed explained that the "underlying
or root causes of the Tensions have not been addressed" and that donors
might have done more to support SIG in this. 29 6 Take land as an example: in
Solomon Islands, land disputes were a key driver of conflict, and forced
288. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 5.
289. DINNEN & HALEY, supra note 24, at 5.
290. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 10.
291. Id. at 11.
292. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka et al., discussion at the World Bank Praxis Discussion
Series: Conflict and Transition (June 14, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUv
KObfYu3O.
293. See WORLD BANK, supra note 70, at 202, 204.
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evictions from housing and/or land widespread. These constituted violations
of housing and property rights, with implications also for the enjoyment of
other economic, social and cultural rights. 29 7 While politically difficult, do-
nors might have placed greater priority on supporting SIG to resolve land
disputes, by reforming institutions; for example, through legislative reform
to enable enforcement of land rights, or doing more to support the flailing
land commission established in Solomon Islands to inquire into land deal-
ings. 298 This is an example of the kind of "development-sensitive" transi-
tional justice measures that Duthie extols: where transitional justice
addresses "development-related issues" such as land. 2 9 9
E. Mechanisms for Local and Traditional Justice
Development and human rights practitioner and scholar Uvin persua-
sively argues that "where outsiders seek to promote social changes" they
must understand "local dynamics and perceptions."300 Transitional justice
aid undeniably seeks to effect social changes: we know that donors engage
with transitional justice for various reasons, including enhanced human
rights protections, promotion of gender equality, the rule of law and recon-
ciliation. Interviewees attested to this during fieldwork and program docu-
mentation of donor agencies corroborate this finding. Each of these goals is
clearly an example of social change. As a starting point for transitional jus-
tice aid, donors should be asking: "What is already being done by local
people to address the problems? What do they think they have learned?
What constraints can they identify, that is, what has made their work diffi-
cult in the past?" 301 This kind of questioning and reflection is both a precur-
sor of and central to effective development practice in the transitional
justice sphere. These kinds of questions should be considered on an ongo-
ing basis and throughout the aid program cycle, not only in the immediate
aftermath of conflict. This goes towards ensuring that development assis-
297. OHCHR, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 47.
298. See Commission of Inquiry into Land Dealings Begin, SOLOMON TIMES ON-
LINE, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.solomontimes.com/news/commission-of-inquiry-into-
land-dealings-begin/4386 (reporting the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry
into Land Dealings and Abandoned Properties on Guadalcanal in 2008 to inquire into
customary land dealings). However, the commission has been suspended indefinitely
due to allegations of corruption, ICTJ, supra note 48, demonstrating how complex, and
politically charged such processes can be when dealing with the underlying causes of
conflict).
299. See Duthie, supra note 1.
300. UVIN, supra note 62, at 123.
301. Id. at 123-24.
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tance remains relevant and does not conflict with or undermine legitimate
local processes.
Donors should consider how their transitional justice aid can comple-
ment or reinforce what local people are already doing to address problems
and needs. By "working with and strengthening what exists and what is
performing relatively well," including at the local level, 302 aid may be more
contextually relevant and effective. However, in Solomon Islands, this has
generally not been the approach of donors, especially in the early stages of
post-conflict transition. This is the case despite the existence of an impor-
tant "grassroots, community-led reconciliation movement" in Solomon Is-
lands that emerged during the Tensions. 303 The response of donors to these
grassroots initiatives has mostly been one of limited or non-engagement-a
missed opportunity that arguably has limited the success of transitional jus-
tice in Solomon Islands.
These grassroots initiatives have played a role in the pursuit of justice
for victims of conflict;30 the meaning of "justice" imbued with contextual
understandings of the term. Solomon Islands scholar Kabutaulaka describes
reconciliation as involving "the restoration of relationships" through the ad-
mission of wrongdoing, attribution of accountability, apology, and the "op-
portunity to forgive." 30 5 These words point to the close relationship between
justice and reconciliation in Solomon Islands culture. In fact, justice may
even be understood as one component of reconciliation. It is in this way that
the grassroots reconciliation movement may be understood through a transi-
tional justice frame.
For the sake of clarity, the analysis in this part is on grassroots, locally-
owned and led processes: kastom and civil society-based initiatives imple-
mented by churches and women's organisations. 306 Kastom dispute resolu-
tion practices are based on traditional structures of "wantoks, kinship ties,
clans, status and social relations." 307 These processes cannot be easily or
neatly categorised and some such processes are effectively hybrid models,
straddling church and custom, state and non-state. This is largely because
while local non-state justice systems have their origins in the precolonial
period, they have also been "profoundly shaped by the colonial and
302. Cox, DUITUTURAGA & SCHEYE, supra note 24, at 6.
303. Jeffery, supra note 6, at 164; McDougall & Kere, supra note 102, at 12.
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postcolonial experience."3 08 Dispute resolution and governance systems in-
troduced in the colonial period continue to greatly influence how justice is
"observed and practiced" at the local level.3 09 As Allen et al. explain: "no-
tional dichotomies between local/traditional systems and state justice sys-
tems cannot be sustained in the face of the prolonged and profound changes
that have occurred in Solomon Islands since the arrival of missionaries and
the colonial government." 310 The confluence of Christianity and kastom also
contribute to this hybrid quality. McDougall and Kere also note the pluralis-
tic quality of local approaches to conflict-resolution and peacemaking.3 "
Both indigenous and exogenous techniques, structures, and institutions are
drawn on to resolve conflict and for reconciliation.
During fieldwork, a number of interviewees attested to the pivotal role
that Christianity and the Christian churches of Solomon Islands have played
in promoting reconciliation at the community level. 3 12 Women's groups
have also been active in peace-making3 13 and in driving reconciliation. 314
During and after the conflict, women's groups worked to build relation-
ships, hosting prayer meetings and peace vigils. Pollard ascribes conflict
resolution as a traditional role for women in Solomon Islands,315 and
Braithwaite et al. recognise the crucial role of women's groups in putting an
end to the conflict.3 16 Further, community leaders have drawn on customary
peacemaking practices as well as Christian rituals to achieve reconcilia-
tion-independent of government or other outside support.3 17
Despite the relative functionality and important contribution of these
local institutions to conflict-resolution and reconciliation, donors have gen-
erally overlooked them in their transitional justice aid. This seems to go
308. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 50, at 7.
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against the notion that effective development practice involves working
with and strengthening what already works well in the country.3 18 Further, a
study conducted by Denney on informal justice in Sierra Leone highlighted
the dominant role of chiefs and other non-state actors in providing services,
including security and justice within communities. 319 Denney points also to
the "strong community loyalty" that they attract-these findings arguably
apply equally to Solomon Islands or at least to myriad communities in Solo-
mon Islands. 320 These are compelling reasons why donors might give
greater consideration to engaging with the local and traditional going
forward.
Working better with local institutions may well have enhanced the
overall success of transitional justice and transitional justice aid in Solomon
Islands, enhancing sustainability, 321 contextual relevance and local legiti-
macy. 3 22 Indeed, in the context of a fieldwork interview, Nori questioned
the local relevance of the Tension Trials. He explained that for Solomon
Islands, it is crucial that justice "recognises local context" and is "rehabili-
tative in its nature"-local or traditional justice mechanisms may well have
better enabled this.3 23 Aid donor partnerships with local institutions may
have been an effective way to counter a criticism commonly directed at the
international community, that it promotes a "homogenised" package of
transitional justice "across the board," which "lacks the social, historical,
and cultural connection to the people who are primarily affected by the
transition. 324
IX. CONCLUSION
Many people criticise foreign aid for its shortcomings, including its
potential for harm. While noting these criticisms, it was not the intention of
this article to condemn aid for its failures. 32 5 As Anderson argues, it is a
"moral and logical fallacy" to conclude that because aid has the potential
for harm, a decision not to give aid would do no harm.3 26 This is because
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withholding aid from people in need would risk "unconscionable negative
ramifications." 32 7 Certainly much can be achieved through aid, including
transitional justice aid. Yet overall in Solomon Islands, foreign aid donors
have neither engaged effectively with transitional justice itself nor lever-
aged transitional justice aid in support of broader development outcomes. It
is precisely this shortcoming that this article has endeavoured to unpack.
The challenge for transitional justice aid going forward-both in Solomon
Islands and globally-is to ensure its effectiveness, without promoting de-
pendency, driving further conflict and exclusion, "undermining local
strengths," or excluding local actors from the development process. 328 Do-
nors have the opportunity to shape their aid to transitional justice so as to
achieve development outcomes and contribute to a just and durable
peace. 329
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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